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Applying differential privacy at scale requires convenient ways to check that programs computing with
sensitive data appropriately preserve privacy. We propose here a fully automated framework for testing
differential privacy, adapting a well-known “pointwise” technique from informal proofs of differential privacy.
Our framework, called DPCheck, requires no programmer annotations, handles all previously verified or tested
algorithms, and is the first fully automated framework to distinguish correct and buggy implementations of
PrivTree, a probabilistically terminating algorithm that has not previously been mechanically checked.
We analyze the probability of DPCheck mistakenly accepting a non-private program and prove that,
theoretically, the probability of false acceptance can be made exponentially small by suitable choice of test
size.
We demonstrate DPCheck’s utility empirically by implementing all benchmark algorithms from prior work
on mechanical verification of differential privacy, plus several others and their incorrect variants, and show
DPCheck accepts the correct implementations and rejects the incorrect variants.
We also demonstrate how DPCheck can be deployed in a practical workflow to test differentially privacy
for the 2020 US Census Disclosure Avoidance System (DAS).
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Differential privacy, testing, symbolic execution
1 INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy, the highest standard for privacy-preserving data analysis, is seeing increasing
real-world deployment [Apple 2017; Microsoft 2017; N. Dajani et al. 2017, etc.]. Differential privacy
offers precise guarantees, is robust to arbitrary post-processing, and gives a quantitative estimate
of privacy loss. However, differentially private algorithms often require subtle reasoning for their
proofs of privacy. Even experts get these proofs wrong [Lyu et al. 2017].
A number of recent efforts have focused on partly or fully automating the process of certifying
differential privacy for sophisticated algorithms such as the sparse vector technique [Dwork and
Roth 2014]. For example, Zhang and Kifer’s LightDP [Zhang and Kifer 2017a] uses a lightweight
dependent type system along with some programmer annotations; Ding et al. [2018] propose a fully
automated statistical testing framework that attempts to disprove differential privacy of queries
using statistical evidence; Albarghouthi and Hsu [2017] demonstrate a completely automated proof
synthesis system with a specialized program logic; and Wang et al. [2019] use a proof technique
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called “Shadow Execution” to improve upon LightDP and further reduce the amount of programmer
annotations required and increase the performance of verification.
We propose a novel framework, called DPCheck, that requires no annotations, handles key
benchmark algorithms from previous work, and moreover can accept correct implementation, and
reject faulty variants of the PrivTree [Zhang et al. 2016] algorithm, a challenging algorithm for
automatic differential privacy verification acknowledged by authors of LightDP [Zhang and Kifer
2017b]. PrivTree was beyond the scope of previous work, owing to a probabilistic main loop that
terminates eventually with probability 1 but is not guaranteed to terminate in any bounded number
of iterations. Our key insight is that we can combine information from instrumented and symbolic
executions of a program to construct privacy proofs for specific executions, then combine these
proofs from a large number of executions to give a statistical guarantee of random differential
privacy [Hall et al. 2013]. The symbolic interpreter uses information gathered by the instrumented
interpreter to build a simple static analysis of the program’s privacy properties, making automated
detection of privacy leaks, even for challenging algorithms, feasible.
Following a short review of differential privacy in Section 2 and an overview of DPCheck’s
syntax and semantics in Section 3 and Section 4, we offer these main contributions:
(1) We present a testing strategy for differential privacy adapted from the pointwise proof tech-
nique (Section 5).
(2) We prove that the testing strategy always correctly accepts a class of well-behaved differen-
tially private programs, and prove that, in principle, this strategy’s probability of incorrectly
accepting ill-behaved (non-private) programs decreases exponentially as test size increases,
for a class of ill-behaved programs defined in the framework of random differential privacy
(Section 6). We then give an overview of the testing strategy implementation for DPCheck in
Haskell (Section 5.4).
(3) We demonstrate the effectiveness of the testing strategy by showing that it can detect non-
private variants with common programming mistakes, and published mistakes made by
experts on the sophisticated benchmark algorithms, and that it accepts correct implementa-
tions of all these algorithms. In particular, DPCheck is the first automated framework that
can distinguish correct and incorrect variants of PrivTree (Section 7.1). These benchmark
algorithms’ differential privacy proofs cover a wide range of complexity, demonstrating
DPCheck can analyze both simple and sophisticated differentially private programs.
(4) We present a practical workflow that uses DPCheck to re-implement and test the core
differential privacymechanisms in the Disclosure Avoidance System (DAS) [Petti and Flaxman
2019] designed for 2020 US Census; we also show statistical evidence that our re-implemented
core mechanism behaves the same as the unmodified DAS (Section 7.2).
(5) We implement DPCheck as an embedded language in Haskell and discuss a type-driven
optimization adapted from Torlak and Bodik [2014] to speed up symbolic execution, which
improves testing time for some our benchmark algorithms (Section 8).
Section 9 enumerates some limitations, and Sections 10 and 11 discuss related and future work.
2 BACKGROUND
A discrete distribution over values of type 𝜏 is a function of type 𝜏 ↦→ [0, 1] mapping each value
in 𝜏 to an associated probability. We write ⃝ 𝜏 for the set of discrete distributions over values in
type 𝜏 . An event 𝐸 is a subset of 𝜏 . The support of a discrete distribution 𝜇 is the subset of 𝜏 whose
values have non-zero probability: supp(𝜇) = {𝑥 ∈ 𝜏 | 𝜇 (𝑥) > 0}.
Definition 1. Let 𝜇 :: ⃝ 𝜏 be a discrete distribution. We call 𝜇 a sub-distribution if the sum of
probabilities over its support is at most 1:
∑
𝑣∈supp 𝜇 𝜇 (𝑣) ≤ 1.
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Sub-distributions are useful for describing the semantics of randomized programs because they
naturally model non-termination through the “missing probability.” In what follows, we write just
“distribution” to mean sub-distribution.
Differential privacy is a relational property of randomized programs. Informally, a program is
differentially private if it produces similar distributions when run on similar inputs. The exact
similarity relation on inputs depends on what private information we care about protecting. For
example, a program 𝑓 may be counting the number of patients diagnosed with some disease in
a medical database; to conform to regulations, we must not leak the diagnosis of any particular
patient. More precisely, the distribution of outputs should be nearly the same if the diagnosis of any
single patient changes in the input database. For this example, an appropriate similarity relation on
inputs is “at most one patient’s data may be different between the two input databases,” or, more
generally:
Definition 2. Two multisets have database distance 𝑘 if at most 𝑘 items must be added or removed
to make the two contain exactly the same items.
Another common similarity relation is the 𝐿1-distance between two vectors of numbers.
Definition 3. The 𝐿1 distance between vectors 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 is the sum of the coordinate-wise distances
between corresponding elements of the two vectors.
Finally, some algorithms’ notion of similar inputs is vectors with bounded coordinate-wise
distance.
Definition 4. Vectors 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 have coordinate-wise distance 𝑘 if |𝑥1 [𝑖] − 𝑥2 [𝑖] | is bounded by
𝑘 for each coordinate 𝑖 .
Here is the fundamental definition of differential privacy:
Definition 5. A randomized program 𝑓 :: 𝜏 ↦→ ⃝ 𝜎 is (𝜖, 𝛿)-differentially private if, for all
similar inputs (𝑥1, 𝑥2) ∈ 𝜏 × 𝜏 , the probability of any event 𝐸 ⊆ 𝜎 satisfies the inequality
P𝑓 (𝑥1) [𝐸] ≤ 𝑒𝜖P𝑓 (𝑥2) [𝐸] + 𝛿. (1)
If the support of the probability distributions is countable, we can simplify the definition of
(𝜖, 0)-differential privacy using a pointwise inequality on the probability difference:
Definition 6. A randomized program 𝑓 :: 𝜏 ↦→ ⃝ 𝜎 , for some countable domain 𝜎 , is (𝜖, 0)-
differentially private if, for all similar inputs (𝑥1, 𝑥2) ∈ 𝜏 × 𝜏 , the probability of any singleton event
𝑣 ∈ 𝜎 satisfies
P𝑓 (𝑥1) [{𝑣}] ≤ 𝑒𝜖P𝑓 (𝑥2) [{𝑣}] .
The 𝜖 and 𝛿 in the definition of differential privacy are “privacy parameters.” We can interpret
them as a quantitative measure of how much privacy is lost when a sample is observed from the
output distribution. As 𝜖 increases, the multiplicative bound on the difference in probabilities of
output events becomes looser, increasing an attacker’s confidence in distinguishing two executions
of 𝑓 on similar inputs. Experts recommend picking small 𝜖 values (e.g., 1.0) for meaningful privacy
protection [Hsu et al. 2014]. On the other hand, 𝛿 bounds the probability of “catastrophic failure”—
failure to provide any privacy at all. It should generally be very small.
DPCheck only guarantees to accept programs that achieve (𝜖, 0)-differential privacy. However,
nonzero 𝛿s will play a role in our analysis of false negatives—tests in which DPCheck fails to detect
a non-(𝜖, 0)-differentially private program.
An important tool for writing differentially private algorithms is the Laplace distribution. It is
commonly defined as a continuous distribution, but rigorous proofs of differential privacy using
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continuous distributions require sophisticated measure theory [Sato et al. 2019]. To simplify the
required foundations, we follow previous work on program semantics and differential privacy
[Albarghouthi and Hsu 2017; Hsu 2017; Reed and Pierce 2010; Wang et al. 2019; Zhang and Kifer
2017b] and assume a discretized, countable support over the reals for all representable numbers.
We write 𝜔 for the constant gap1 between consecutive values—the granularity of the discretized
domain. In this work, we assume all real values are drawn from this discretized domain with
granularity 𝜔 .
The discretized Laplace distribution is formally a two-sided geometric distribution [Ghosh et al.
2009]. It is parameterized by a center 𝑐 and a parameter 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1]. Ghosh et al. [2009] show
the two-sided geometric distribution shares the important privacy properties of the continuous
Laplace distribution. The continuous Laplace distribution is parameterized by a center 𝑐 and a
width parameter 𝑤 that controls how centered the distribution is around 𝑐 . Ghosh et al. [2009]
also show a straightforward translation between the two-sided geometric distribution parameter
𝛼 and the corresponding parameter𝑤 for an equivalent discretized Laplace distribution. We will
exclusively use the width parameter𝑤 to parameterize discrete Laplace distributions in this work.
Each rectangle’s area in the graph to the right represents the prob-
ability assigned to the point at the center of the base of the rectangle;
each rectangle has width exactly 𝜔—the granularity of the set of
representable numbers. We write lap𝑐,𝑤 for the discretized Laplace
distribution with center 𝑐 and noise width𝑤 .
3 TYPES AND SYNTAX
DPCheck is a testing framework built around a probabilistic programming language embedded in
the functional language Haskell. We will refer to the embedded language itself as DPCheck and to
the rest of our system as the “testing framework.”
The DPCheck language offers a simple, purely functional, notation for differentially private
programming. DPCheck provides base types Bool, Int, and Double, as well as three container types:
tuples (𝜏, 𝜎), lists [𝜏], and maps Map𝜏 𝜎 . Finally, DPCheck supports probabilistic programming
through a distribution monad ⃝: the type ⃝ 𝜏 represents a (sub-)distribution over values of type 𝜏 .
Unlike a number of previously proposed functional languages for differential privacy [Gaboardi
et al. 2013; Reed and Pierce 2010, etc.], DPCheck’s type system does not track privacy: this is the
job of the testing framework.
We embed DPCheck inside Haskell, using methods developed by Svenningsson and Axelsson
[2013, 2015] for the Feldspar language [Axelsson et al. 2010]. Their key insight is a technique for
combining “deep” and “shallow” representations of programs, where a deep representation for
a program is an abstract syntax tree, while a shallow representation maps language constructs
directly to their semantics. Here, the deeply represented parts of the language can be used by
DPCheck’s symbolic interpreter for static analysis, while the shallowly represented parts save
engineering on things like surface syntax, standard libraries, and compilation by borrowing from
the host language.
DPCheck’s deep representation in Haskell uses values of an indexed datatype Expr. For example,
a Haskell term of type Expr Bool represents a DPCheck program that yields values of type Bool
when evaluated. The type index (Bool) allows us to borrow Haskell’s typechecker to rule out
ill-formed programs statically.
DPCheck’s most important syntactic forms are:
1We present DPCheck and its properties using this idealized set of representable reals, but our implementation relies on
floating point numbers. This discrepancy and its impact on testing are discussed in Section 9.
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data Expr a where
Literal :: a → Expr a
Add :: Expr Double → Expr Double → Expr Double
Lt :: Expr Double → Expr Double → Expr Bool
If :: Expr Bool → Expr (⃝ a) → Expr (⃝ a) → Expr (⃝ a)
Laplace :: Expr Double → Double → Expr (⃝ a)
Return :: Expr a → Expr (⃝ a)
Bind :: Expr (⃝ a) → (Expr a → Expr (⃝ b)) → Expr (⃝ b)
These are Haskell constructors allowing us to build DPCheck programs that perform arithmetic
using Add, compare numeric values using Lt, branch on boolean conditions using If, sample from
Laplace distributions using Laplace, sequence probabilistic computations using Bind, and create
point mass distributions using Return.2 The Bind and Return constructors endow DPCheck with
monadic structure [Moggi 1989], allowing computations that return distributions to be coded in a
natural style. Additionally, the purity of Haskell automatically rules out programs with potentially
non-private side-effects (such as using the current system time to calculate an argument to Literal
), because the types of the constructors only allow effect manipulation related to probability
distributions.3
As an example, we consider implementing the ReportNoisyMax algorithm in DPCheck. The
ReportNoisyMax algorithm returns the index of the largest noisy value . Assuming an input list of [1,
2, 10] to ReportNoisyMax, and the noise values are 0.8,−1.2 and −0.9, ReportNoisyMax returns
the index of the largest value from the noised list [1.8, 0.8, 9.1]. We can define ReportNoisyMax
with the following Haskell syntax and a Haskell library combinator mapM that applies a function
uniformly over a list:
rnm :: [Expr Double] → Expr (⃝ Int)
rnm (x:xs) = do
xNoised ← lap x 1.0
xsNoised ← mapM (𝜆y. lap y 1.0) xs
rnmAux xsNoised 0 0 xNoised
rnm [] = error "rnm received empty input"
rnmAux :: [Expr Double] → Expr Int → Expr Int → Expr Double
→ Expr (⃝ Int)
rnmAux [] _ maxIdx _ = return maxIdx
rnmAux (x:xs) lastIdx maxIdx currMax = do
let thisIdx = lastIdx + 1
if (x > currMax)
(rnmAux xs thisIdx thisIdx x)
(rnmAux xs thisIdx maxIdx currMax)
The left pointing arrow ← is a syntactic sugar of the Bind constructor for sequencing proba-
bilistic computations. Intuitively, the syntax x ← m represents a program fragment that runs the
probabilistic computation m, giving the result of that computation a name x, and allows x to be used
in following computations.
Conceptually, executing DPCheck programs through Haskell is a two-stage process: Haskell
itself becomes a host language for constructing embedded DPCheck programs, which are then
2The width parameter to the Laplace constructor has type Double instead of Expr Double. This implies the width
parameter must be a statically chosen constant. This restriction simplifies the testing framework implementation, and it
does not rule out any algorithms in our evaluation.
3In the current implementation, it is still possible to escape Expr’s restrictions by using unsafe language features to subvert
Haskell’s type system. We could fix this by requiring DPCheck programmers to only use Safe Haskell [Terei et al. 2012],
ruling out such subversions completely. In this paper, we assume the programmer is not adversarial and only wants to test
programs that she genuinely believes are differentially private.
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executed using an eval function (see Appendix E ). This arrangement allows programmers to use
convenient Haskell syntax and libraries when writing DPCheck programs.
An unusual aspect of DPCheck’s syntax design is that we rely on recursion in Haskell for—in
effect—generating iterative DPCheck code. This design relies critically on Haskell’s support for
lazy evaluation. Iteration through host-level recursion, if implemented in a strictly evaluated host
language, would restrict the kinds of algorithms that can be represented, since a strict host-language
would fully construct the syntax tree before sending it off to an interpreter. This implies all loops
built with strict host-language recursion would be fully unrolled immediately. Some programs
may have unbounded loops in some control flow paths, and such programs will cause divergence
under this scheme. Fortunately, since Haskell is lazily evaluated, its runtime does not construct a
value until the value’s contents are required. This means the Haskell code that constructs DPCheck
syntax does not run until that syntax is required by the interpreter. In our implementation, we rely
on Haskell’s lazy evaluation to automatically interleave DPCheck code execution and (potentially
infinite) loop unrolling.4
When the function rnm is applied to an input list xs, we obtain a closed DPCheck program
with type Expr (⃝ Int). This program contains data that represents DPCheck commands to be
interpreted. The initial commands are Laplace sampling commands that add noise to the input list.
These commands are generated with 𝜆 y. lap y 1.0, which builds the Laplace nodes in a DPCheck
program’s syntax tree, and mapM, which applies this function for all items in a list. We then loop
over the noised data, keeping track of the maximum value and its index seen so far through If
commands, and return the index at the end with the helper function rnmAux.
4 SEMANTICS
We can straightforwardly encodeDPCheck’s evaluation semantics using a function eval :: Expr r→
r (see Appendix E for details). Recall that a differentially private program whose syntax tree has
type Expr (⃝ 𝑎) is necessarily probabilistic. Calling eval on such a program results in a distribution
(value) of type ⃝ 𝑎, and we can sample from this distribution to acquire a concrete output value.
Besides this evaluation semantics, the testing framework also uses symbolic execution [King
1976] of DPCheck programs. During symbolic execution, concrete samples from Laplace distri-
butions are replaced by symbols, allowing us to explore all possible control flows throughout a
DPCheck program, even when branch conditions depend on sampled values. The symbolic execu-
tion process records the branch conditions along each control flow path; we call these recorded
boolean conditions path conditions. As an example, if we run rnm on an input list of length two,
then the symbolic execution process will create two symbolic values 𝑠0 and 𝑠1, one for each noised
sample value. On one path, we explore under the assumption that the branch condition 𝑠0 > 𝑠1
evaluates to True, and this results, say, in the output value 0; on the other path, we explore under
the assumption that 𝑠0 > 𝑠1 evaluates to False, and this results in the output value 1. So, in this
example, symbolically executing rnm on this input list of length two yields two possible output
values 0 and 1, with path conditions 𝑠0 > 𝑠1 = True and 𝑠0 > 𝑠1 = False.
5 TESTING DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
To show how DPCheck tests differential privacy, we first review how proofs of differential privacy
are constructed (5.1), with ReportNoisyMax as an example (5.2). Then we discuss how to adapt the
same basic ideas to testing (5.3).
4Although the ordinary DPCheck interpreter handles infinite syntax trees thanks to laziness, this doesn’t help the symbolic
interpreter, because it tries to explore all paths. However, we can use auxiliary information to stop potentially infinite
symbolic execution as soon as no further control flow path exploration is necessary. See Section 9.
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5.1 Background: apRHL
Differential privacy experts often approach proofs in a “pointwise” fashion using Definition 6:
Given two executions on similar inputs, first demonstrate that, no matter what concrete value the
first execution of rnm yields, the second execution can also produce the same result; then show that
the multiplicative difference in the total probability of all executions that lead to these identical
outputs is bounded by the algorithm’s prescribed privacy parameter.
Barthe et al. [2016a] formalized the pointwise proof technique in a program logic for differential
privacy called apRHL (approximate, relational Hoare logic). A key innovation of apRHL is its
notion of “approximate lifting,” which abstracts over relations between distributions. Approximate
lifting allows us to use a deterministic relation to simultaneously couple all samples from one
distribution with samples from the other distribution, effectively reducing probabilistic reasoning
to deterministic reasoning. The details of apRHL are beyond the scope of this paper ([Hsu 2017]
is a readable introduction); here we just sketch the parts on which our testing strategy is most
immediately based.
An apRHL judgment for differential privacy has the form ⊢ 𝑐 ∼(𝜖,𝛿) 𝑐 : Φ ⇒ Ψ, where 𝑐 is a
randomized program.5 It describes a relation between the output distributions on related executions
of 𝑐 . Here, Φ is a pre-condition on the free variables of 𝑐 between related executions, and Ψ
is a deterministic relation on the output samples of 𝑐 that, behind the scenes, is lifted into the
corresponding relation between the output distributions through apRHL’s approximate lifting
machinery. The parameters (𝜖, 𝛿) represent the “cost” of establishing the post-condition relation Ψ.
When Ψ asserts that the related outputs of 𝑐 are equal, which implies differential privacy for the
program 𝑐 , the parameters (𝜖, 𝛿) are exactly the privacy cost.
For example, to state that rnm is (2, 0)-differentially private using an apRHL judgment, we first
encode the similarity relation of the inputs in the precondition. Two similar inputs of rnmmust have
coordinate-wise distance bounded by 1, which we encode with the assertion
∧
𝑖 |𝑥𝑠1 [𝑖]−𝑥𝑠2 [𝑖] | < 1.
Then, to encode differential privacy, we assert the outputs of two executions on similar inputs are
identical in the post condition:
⊢ (out1 ← rnm𝑥𝑠1) ∼(2,0) (out2 ← rnm𝑥𝑠2) :
(∧
𝑖
|𝑥𝑠1 [𝑖] − 𝑥𝑠2 [𝑖] | < 1
)
⇒ (out1 = out2 ).
Two key proof rules that formalize the pointwise proof technique are called Lap-Gen and PW-Eq.
The Lap-Gen rule allows us to connect Laplace samples in two executions with a deterministic
relation through apRHL’s approximate lifting theory. In particular, this deterministic relation allows
us to assume (in the postcondition) that the samples drawn from the Laplace distribution on the
two runs are at a fixed distance 𝑘 apart.
Lap-Gen
𝜖 = |𝑘 + 𝑒1 − 𝑒2 |/𝑤
⊢ (𝑥1 ← lap 𝑒1𝑤) ∼(𝜖,0) (𝑥2 ← lap 𝑒2𝑤) : Φ⇒ (𝑥1 + 𝑘 = 𝑥2)
Readers encountering couplings for the first time may worry that this proof rule looks too good to
be true, since it allows us to assume related samples are always at a deterministic distance 𝑘 apart.
What makes this work is that we are not considering some particular pair of samples; rather, we are
relating the entire support from two Laplace distributions simultaneously. Furthermore, establishing
5More generally, a relation can be established between syntactically different program fragments 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 instead of a
single program 𝑐 . This general form of apRHL judgment is useful for intermediates steps of proofs; we ignore this refinement
here for the sake of simplicity.
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such a relation in the post-condition does not come for free: we are allowed to choose any 𝑘 , but
the privacy cost also depends on 𝑘 .
This deterministic rule abstracts away direct reasoning over the related Laplace distributions. In
Section 5.2, we will present an example that applies Lap-Gen to prove rnm is (2, 0)-differentially
private. We will refer to these 𝑘 values used in Lap-Gen rules as “shift values.”
The PW-Eq rule is a formal description of the pointwise proof technique: if we can show that,
for each possible output value 𝑟 ∈ 𝜏 , one execution returning 𝑟 implies that the other execution
also returns 𝑟 , then these pointwise facts together constitute a complete differential privacy proof.6
PW-Eq
𝑒1, 𝑒2 :: 𝜏 ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝜏, ⊢ 𝑐1 ∼(𝜖,0) 𝑐2 : Φ⇒ (𝑒1 = 𝑟 → 𝑒2 = 𝑟 )
⊢ 𝑐1 ∼(𝜖,0) 𝑐2 : Φ⇒ (𝑒1 = 𝑒2)
The variables 𝑒1 and 𝑒2 here represent the output values of 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 respectively. The power of
PW-Eq is that, for each 𝑟 ∈ 𝜏 , we are allowed to choose a different shift value for any application
of the Lap-Gen proof rule that may appear in the subderivation for this 𝑟 . To prove rnm is (2, 0)-
differentially private, we will apply exactly this strategy: given any output 𝑟 from one execution of
rnm, we choose some sequence of shift values so that the noisy max also occurs at 𝑟 in the second
execution, forcing the second execution to also return 𝑟 .
With these two proof rules, the process of proving differential privacy for ReportNoisyMax
reduces to a simpler goal: for each possible output of ReportNoisyMax, find a sequence of shift
values to relate the Laplace samples between two executions so that their output values are identical.
Section 5.3 will show how we use the ideas behind the Lap-Gen and PW-Eq rules in designing
our testing strategy for differential privacy. But first, a concrete example.
5.2 An Example Privacy Proof
Let’s consider a (paraphrase of a) proof by Dwork and Roth [2014] of (2, 0)-differential privacy
for rnm when the coordinate-wise distance (Definition 4) between the inputs is bounded by 1. We
present this proof by sketching applications of Lap-Gen and PW-Eq, and emphasizing steps in the
proof that will become key ingredients in our testing algorithm by putting boxes around equations.
This proof can be carried out formally in apRHL, but we present it informally to avoid getting
bogged down in details.
Theorem 7. ReportNoisyMax is (2, 0)-differentially private.
Proof. The implementation of ReportNoisyMax creates a list of noised values based on its input.
Let 𝑟 be any possible output of running rnm. Let argmax be the function that returns the index of
the largest value in a list. When rnm runs on an list of input values, it first adds Laplace noise to each
of these values, then iterates over the noised values, keeping track of the index of the maximum
value seen so far, and finally returns that index. Write 𝑞𝑠 ′1 and 𝑞𝑠 ′2 for the two intermediate lists of
noised values from 𝑞𝑠1 and 𝑞𝑠2. Then, if 𝑟 is the result of running rnm on 𝑞𝑠1, it is easy to see that
𝑟 = argmax𝑞𝑠 ′1.
We next apply the pointwise proof technique described in Section 5.1. Since we assumed one
execution of rnm returned index 𝑟 , we need to show some control flow through the run of rnm on
𝑞𝑠2 yields the same 𝑟 . We demonstrate such a control flow by carefully choosing the shift values
6This rule may appear to be showing—counterintuitively—that different executions of a randomized program produce iden-
tical results. Of course, any two concrete executions of a randomized program will almost certainly produce different results.
But we are not actually reasoning here about some particular pair of executions. Rather, we are reasoning simultaneously
about all pairs of coupled executions.
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introduced in the Lap-Gen proof rule. Concretely, we need to ensure 𝑟 = argmax𝑞𝑠 ′2, under some
choice of the shift values that connects each 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖] and 𝑞𝑠 ′2 [𝑖].
We proceed by applying Lap-Gen to each pair of noised values with the following choice of shift
values, coupling each 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖] with 𝑞𝑠 ′2 [𝑖] such that 𝑞𝑠 ′2 [𝑖] = 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖] + shift𝑖 :
shift𝑖 =
{
1 if 𝑖 == 𝑟
𝑞𝑠2 [𝑖] − 𝑞𝑠1 [𝑖] otherwise
(2)
This choice implies that the maximum value in the second noised array also occurs at index 𝑟 :
we know that −1 < 𝑞𝑠2 [𝑖] − 𝑞𝑠1 [𝑖] < 1 for all 𝑖 , since 𝑞𝑠1 and 𝑞𝑠2 are similar inputs. In particular,
𝑞𝑠2 [𝑖] − 𝑞𝑠1 [𝑖] < 1. Adding 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖] to both sides of this inequality yields
𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖] + (𝑞𝑠2 [𝑖] − 𝑞𝑠1 [𝑖]) < 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖] + 1.
Since𝑞𝑠 ′2 [𝑖] = 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖]+(𝑞𝑠2 [𝑖]−𝑞𝑠1 [𝑖]) if 𝑖 ≠ 𝑟 and𝑞𝑠 ′2 [𝑟 ] = 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑟 ]+1, it follows that 𝑟 = argmax𝑞𝑠 ′2.
We have shown so far that, for any output index 𝑟 from the first execution, it is possible for rnm
to produce the same result 𝑟 on the similar input. Next we need to calculate the 𝜖 privacy cost
incurred by using Lap-Gen for connecting 𝑞𝑠 ′1 with 𝑞𝑠 ′2, and prove 𝜖 is at most 2.
Consider the cost of an application of Lap-Gen between a given pair of 𝑖th sample values 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖]
and 𝑞𝑠 ′2 [𝑖] in the two runs; call this cost𝑖 . Under apRHL, the total privacy cost is bounded by the
sum of the cost𝑖s, so we need to show
∑
𝑖 cost𝑖 < 2.
To bound the sum, let us first consider the cost values for indices 𝑖 ≠ 𝑟 . We know 𝑞𝑠 ′2 [𝑖] is a
sample from the distribution lap𝑞𝑠2 [𝑖 ],1.0, and similarly 𝑞𝑠
′
1 [𝑖] is a sample from lap𝑞𝑠1 [𝑖 ],1.0. Using
Lap-Gen, we can conclude
cost𝑖 = |
((𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖] + 𝑞𝑠2 [𝑖] − 𝑞𝑠1 [𝑖]) − 𝑞𝑠2 [𝑖]) − (𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖] − 𝑞𝑠1 [𝑖]) |
= 0.
On the other hand, if 𝑖 = 𝑟 , let 𝑠 = 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑟 ] − 𝑞𝑠1 [𝑟 ]. We again use Lap-Gen to conclude:
cost𝑟 = | (𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑟 ] − 𝑞𝑠1 [𝑟 ]) − (𝑞𝑠 ′2 [𝑟 ] − 𝑞𝑠2 [𝑟 ]) |
= |𝑠 − (𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑟 ] + 1 − 𝑞𝑠2 [𝑟 ]) | by eq. (2) and assumption of 𝑠
= |𝑠 − (𝑞𝑠1 [𝑟 ] + 𝑠 + 1 − 𝑞𝑠2 [𝑟 ]) | by assumption of 𝑠
= | (𝑞𝑠1 [𝑟 ] − 𝑞𝑠2 [𝑟 ]) + 1|
< 1 + 1 = 2 by the triangle inequality (3)
Since cost values are 0 for indices 𝑖 ≠ 𝑟 and less than 2 when 𝑖 = 𝑟 , the total cost is less than 2. That
is, rnm is (2, 0)-differentially private. □
5.3 From Proving to Testing
The key steps in the above proof are:
(1) Assume an unknown but fixed output 𝑟 from one execution.
(2) Select a sequence of shift values (eq. (2)) to connect the samples from one execution with
samples from the other execution.
(3) Show that the second execution, whose Laplace samples are fixed through the shift values,
leads to the same output 𝑟 .
(4) Compute the total privacy cost of this pair of executions as the sum of the individual cost
values induced by the chosen sequence of shift values and show this total is less than the
prescribed 𝜖 = 2 (eq. (3)).
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In order to convert this to a testing procedure, we need to check that, for a run of rnm on 𝑞𝑠1,
there exists a dual execution of rnm on 𝑞𝑠2 leading to the same output, such that the Laplace samples
in these two executions can be connected through a sequence of shift values, while keeping the
total privacy cost induced by the shift values under 2.0. However, we need to be careful about
how many distinct sequences of shift values are allowed for constructing dual executions. The
PW-Eq rule allows us to choose one sequence of shift values for each unique output 𝑟 that rnm may
return. Thus, for testing, we must group the runs of rnm on 𝑞𝑠1 by their output, and then try to find
a single sequence of shift values for each group, such that this single sequence of shift values leads
to corresponding executions of rnm on 𝑞𝑠2 with the same output.
With this in mind, the first step in testing is to run rnm on 𝑞𝑠1 a large number of times and group
the runs by their final output values.
Next we need to find the shift values. In steps 2 and 3 of the proof above, we used expert insight
to select shift values that allowed us to show that the dual execution must result in the same output
𝑟 . When testing, we begin with hypothetical (symbolic) shift values and hope to work out their
concrete values later: we create one symbolic shift value for each 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖] per group, and pair 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖]
with a 𝑞𝑠 ′2 [𝑖] through the following equation
𝑞𝑠 ′2 [𝑖] = 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖] + shift𝑖 . (4)
This equation is exactly how Lap-Gen allows us to connect two Laplace samples. (Throughout this
discussion, we highlight the important symbolic formulas created in the testing steps by boxing
them.) This also induces a symbolic cost using Lap-Gen, where
cost𝑖 =
| (𝑞𝑠 ′2 [𝑖] − 𝑞𝑠2 [𝑖]) − (𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖] − 𝑞𝑠1 [𝑖]) |
𝑤
=
|𝑞𝑠1 [𝑖] + shift𝑖 − 𝑞𝑠2 [𝑖] |
𝑤
. (5)
Here 𝑞𝑠1 [𝑖] is the concrete center supplied to the 𝑖th call to the sampling instruction in the first
execution, shift𝑖 is a fresh symbolic variable, 𝑞𝑠2 [𝑖] is the concrete center used in the 𝑖th sampling
instruction in the second execution, and𝑤 is the (known constant) parameter controlling the width
of the Laplace distributions used in rnm. Thus, both 𝑞𝑠 ′2 [𝑖] and cost𝑖 can be represented as symbolic
expressions coupled with concrete execution traces using the formulas above if we know what
𝑞𝑠1 [𝑖] and 𝑞𝑠 ′1 [𝑖] are.
To capture 𝑞𝑠1 and gather many independent samples of 𝑞𝑠 ′1 for testing, we repeatedly run
rnm on 𝑞𝑠1 with a special interpreter that instruments Laplace sample instructions, recording the
center, width, and returned sample value for each. We group each unique output 𝑟 together with
all sequences of Laplace sample and parameters that lead to the output 𝑟 into a bucket.
For each bucket bkt , we need to show there exists a coupling that connects all sampled traces in
bkt to the Laplace samples from running on 𝑞𝑠2, such that this coupling leads the dual execution
on 𝑞𝑠2 to the same result 𝑟 from bkt . To find such a coupling, we symbolically execute rnm with
symbolic samples 𝑞𝑠 ′2, observing all possible outputs of rnm along all of the control flow paths.
Among these paths, some will return 𝑟 . We gather all of the path conditions from control flow paths
that lead to 𝑟 . These path conditions are then used to constrain the shift values from eq. (4), so that
the coupled dual execution only takes the paths that yield the same output 𝑟 . We use Φ𝑟 to denote
the symbolic formula that encodes the path conditions, and Ω𝑟 to denote the symbolic formula
that encodes the shift equations (eq. (4)). These two symbolic formulas form the testing analog of
step 2 and 3 from the proof.
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Finally, to bound the total privacy cost (as in step 4 of the proof), we create another symbolic
formula using the symbolic expressions for each cost𝑖 :∑︁
𝑖
cost𝑖 ≤ 2 (6)
Together, the boxed symbolic formulas constitute a query that can be dispatched to an off-the-
shelf SMT solver—we use Z3 [De Moura and Bjørner 2008]. If the solver returns a satisfying model
for these constraints, then we know the distributions produced by running rnm on this particular
pair of 𝑞𝑠1 and 𝑞𝑠2 likely satisfy 2-differential privacy. Of course, this does not guarantee differential
privacy, because we used sampled traces of Laplace calls to describe properties of a potential proof
for differential privacy, instead of universally quantifying over all possible samples in one execution,
as in the proof.
At the core of both the proof and the SMT formula is the relation between 𝑞𝑠 ′1 and 𝑞𝑠 ′2. The
proof demonstrates that there exist shift values such that the related Laplace samples satisfy the
privacy cost bounds. The testing process also checks for the existence of such shift values; however,
it has a chance of admitting programs that are not (𝜖, 0)-differentially private, because testing
does not produce a complete proof of differential privacy—it only checks whether dual executions
satisfying differential privacy exist on some set of sampled traces. There are two important test
parameters—number of pairs of randomly generated similar inputs, and number of sampled traces
collected on a given pair of similar input—that can be independently tuned to make tests more
difficult to pass for faulty programs. Intuitively, as we increase both test parameters, it should be
less and less likely that our testing process accepts a faulty program. We call programs that are
faulty but slip past DPCheck’s testing framework false negatives.
A non-(𝜖, 0)-differentially private program may be faulty for two reasons: 1) it may have a
non-zero 𝛿 failure probability, and 2) there may exist similar inputs (𝑥1, 𝑥2) for which the program
produces distributions that do not satisfy definition 6 with the given 𝜖 . Note that the definitions of
differential privacy (5 and 6) require the relation on output distributions in definition 6 to hold on
all similar inputs. Although DPCheck’s testing framework can check that eq. (1) holds on a pair
of fixed similar inputs by checking the existence of shift values and dual executions, it can never
exhaustively check that eq. (1) holds on a potentially infinite set of similar pairs of inputs.
Instead, DPCheck gives probabilistic guarantees using the framework of random differential
privacy [Hall et al. 2013]. In the next section, we review random differential privacy and use it to
state our main theoretical testing guarantee (Theorem 12).
5.4 Implementation
We now describe the testing process more concretely, showing type signatures of Haskell functions
that implement key testing steps.
DPCheck’s testing framework takes as inputs a program under test, prog :: 𝜎 → Expr (⃝ 𝜏), a
generator, gen :: Gen (𝜎, 𝜎),7 that produces pairs of similar inputs for prog, and a privacy parameter
𝜖 . It then checks, for a large number of (𝑥1, 𝑥2) pairs produced by gen, that the distributions
produced by running prog𝑥1 and prog𝑥2 satisfy eq. (1). If it ever finds one that does not, it rejects
prog; otherwise it validates prog as likely to be (𝜖, 0)-differential private. (We discuss what “likely”
means more formally in Section 6. We also show how much time DPCheck takes to reject buggy
benchmark programs in Figure 3 in the appendices.) The more tests a program passes, the more
likely the program really is (𝜖, 0)-differentially private. Our experiments on benchmark algorithms
show that DPCheck rejects many faulty programs within 10 seconds, but it may take significantly
7A value of type Gen𝜏 is a function that takes a seed and produces a pseudo-random value of type 𝜏 .
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longer testing time to reject algorithms that only demonstrate privacy violations on larger inputs
(see Appendix D for detailed benchmark study).
To verify that the distributions produced by a particular pair of similar inputs are related, we
need to construct a coupling between the Laplace distribution samples used by prog𝑥1 and prog𝑥2
using the methods described in Section 5. We first acquire concrete sample values from some large
number (call it 𝑁 ) of runs of prog𝑥1.8 We denote the output from the 𝑖 th run by 𝑟𝑖 :: 𝜏 and the
sample trace from each of these runs by tr 𝑖 :: Trace, where
type SampleInfo = (Double , Double , Double)
type Trace = [SampleInfo]
and where the following projections extract sample, center, and width values from a SampleInfo:
sample , center , width :: SampleInfo → Double
With the collected outputs 𝑟1, 𝑟2, . . . , 𝑟𝑁 and traces tr1, tr2, . . . , tr𝑁 , we perform a “bucketing”
process so that all traces that lead to the same output value 𝑟 are grouped together.
type Buckets 𝜏 = Map 𝜏 [Trace]
bucket :: [(𝜏 , Trace)] → Buckets 𝜏
A value of this map type represents a collection of buckets; a particular key-value pair (of an output
value with its associated list of traces) is a single bucket.
Next, we perform symbolic execution on prog𝑥2. To do this, we first perform a simple program
transformation: streamline :: Expr (⃝ 𝜏) → [Expr (⃝ 𝜏)]. This transformation repeatedly
replaces a program containing If commands with two new programs in which the If command
is replaced by sequencing Assert cond with the commands in the true branch and sequencing
Assert (not cond) with commands in the false branch.
data Expr a where
...
Assert :: Expr Bool → Expr (⃝ ())
Sequence :: Expr (⃝ ()) → Expr (⃝ a) → Expr (⃝ a)
This simplistic approach produces 2𝑛 straight-line programs in the worst case, where 𝑛 is the
number of If statements; we will discuss a type-driven optimization adapted from [Torlak and
Bodik 2014] for speeding up symbolic execution in Section 8.
Note that streamline would actually diverge on infinite syntax trees if Haskell were not lazy.
Our symbolic interpreter uses information gathered by instrumented implementation to cut off
infinite symbolic execution as soon as possible. We use this early cutoff trick in the evaluation of
PrivTree; the trick and some directions for generalizing it are discussed in more detail in Section 9.
The programs resulting from this transformation are free of conditional branches, instead
explicitly encoding path conditions using Assert nodes. We next take these transformed programs
and run symbolic execution guided by the trace buckets from the instrumented executions above.
Consider a particular set of executions that lead to the output value 𝑟 , and let the associated trace
bucket contain the traces tr 𝑖1 , tr 𝑖2 , . . . , tr 𝑖𝑘 , where 𝑖1, 𝑖2, . . . , 𝑖𝑘 are the indices of instrumented runs
that produced 𝑟 . We then search for paths that produce the same output 𝑟 and build eq. (4) between
the concrete sampled traces and the symbolic Laplace samples. For each trace tr 𝑖𝑘 , we pair it with
symbolic Laplace samples as follows: on the 𝑗th call to the Laplace sampling instruction during
symbolic execution, we create a fresh symbolic value lap𝑖𝑘 [ 𝑗] = sample (tr 𝑖𝑘 [ 𝑗]) + shift 𝑗 . Let
8For invalidating incorrect algorithms, we can start with small 𝑁 (such as 50) and keep increasing 𝑁 by a factor of 10
until the bug is discovered. For validating correct algorithms, 𝑁 should be chosen according to the lower bound on𝑚 in
Theorem 12. However, currently the computational cost of running tests with large 𝑁 makes validation prohibitively slow.
We discuss this issue in Section 9.
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𝜓𝑘 =
∧
𝑗 lap𝑖𝑘 [ 𝑗] = sample (tr 𝑖𝑘 [ 𝑗]) + shift 𝑗 , and Ψ𝑟 =
∧
𝑘 𝜓𝑘 , and let Φ𝑟 encode the disjunction
of the path conditions for all control flow paths that lead to the output 𝑟 .
The final formula Ψ𝑟 ∧ Φ𝑟 ∧ (∑𝑛 cost𝑛 ≤ 𝜖) asserts that prog produces the same output 𝑟 within
the prescribed privacy cost 𝜖 . We perform the same process for each unique output 𝑟 observed
from instrumented executions. If these formulas are all satisfiable, we consider this test a passing
test case, and we do not reject the claim of (𝜖, 0)-differential privacy. On the other hand, if, for
some output 𝑟 , Z3 tells us that the formula is not satisfiable, then the program under test does not
have a point-wise proof of 𝜖-differential privacy using the proof template discussed in Section 5.
This is not a disproof of differential privacy, since the proof template we are using is not complete
(there are algorithms whose privacy proofs do not follow this pattern), but it is at least a signal that
should prompt us to look at the program skeptically.
The code below sketches the testing process on an input procedure to test prog, a pair of
neighboring inputs x1 and x2, an expected privacy parameter eps, and the number of sampled
traces to draw for testing ntraces.
expectDP prog x1 x2 eps ntraces = do
buckets ← instrumentedExec ntraces (prog x1)
let straightlineProgs = streamline (prog x2)
constraints ← symbolicExec buckets straightlineProgs
solverResults ← runSolver eps constraints
expect (all isOk solverResults)
A distinctive element of our design is the combination of instrumented execution and symbolic
execution. An alternative would be to run symbolic execution on both inputs using relational
symbolic execution [Farina et al. 2017], then universally quantify over the Laplace samples in
one execution, as demonstrated in the analysis of rnm from Section 5. Using relational symbolic
execution would bring more confidence to the differential privacy property of the program under
test, since the satisfying model from the SMT solver will serve as a formal proof of eq. (1) for the
pair of output distributions. However, this approach produces more complex symbolic formulas
that may significantly slow down Z3. To strike a balance between execution time and confidence
gained from a passing test, we choose to combine instrumented execution and symbolic execution.
6 ASYMPTOTIC PRIVACY GUARANTEES
In this section, we introduce random differential privacy (RDP), and use RDP to quantitatively define
“well-behaved” and “ill-behaved” programs. We present Theorem 12, which gives an upper bound
on the probability of DPCheck falsely accepting ill-behaved programs. However, DPCheck has a
scaling bottleneck that prevents us from applying Theorem 12 to produce meaningful guarantees
of random differential privacy on correct programs. We discuss details of the scaling bottleneck
and its implication on statistical validation of correct programs in Section 9.
To introduce random differential privacy, let us first consider an alternative view of the privacy
parameters 𝜖 and 𝛿 .
Definition 8. Let 𝜇1, 𝜇2 :: ⃝ 𝜏 be two distributions with identical support. Define a function
𝑓 :: 𝜏 ↦→ R. Let 𝑓 (𝑣) = ln 𝜇1 (𝑣)𝜇2 (𝑣) . The privacy loss random variable is a distribution pv(𝜇1, 𝜇2) ∈ ⃝ R
defined as: pv(𝜇1, 𝜇2) (𝑥) = ∑𝑣∈supp(𝜇1) s .t . 𝑓 (𝑣) =𝑥 𝜇1 (𝑣).
Informally, this distribution can also be expressed as 𝑓 (𝑣), where the random variable 𝑣 ∼ 𝜇1.
Definition 9 ([Kasiviswanathan and Smith 2014]). Two distributions 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 are (𝜖, 𝛿)-
pointwise indistinguishable if the probability mass of pv(𝜇1, 𝜇2) in the interval [−𝜖, 𝜖] is at least
1 − 𝛿 .
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Note that (𝜖, 𝛿)-pointwise indistinguishability implies eq. (1) in the definition of differential
privacy (Definition 5). Furthermore, the proof template we introduced in Section 5 constructs proofs
of (𝜖, 0)-pointwise indistinguishability.
Definition 10 ([Hall et al. 2013]). Assume a fixed distribution over similar inputs I :: ⃝ (𝜎×𝜎).
A randomized program 𝑓 :: 𝜎 ↦→ ⃝ 𝜏 is (𝜖, 𝛿, 𝛼)-random differentially private if, with probability
at least 1 − 𝛼 , sampling similar inputs (𝑥1, 𝑥2) from I leads to (𝜖, 𝛿)-pointwise indistinguishable
distributions 𝑓 (𝑥1) and 𝑓 (𝑥2).
We can give some intuition for Definition 10 by considering visual graphs of the privacy loss
random variable under given similar inputs. First, assume a distribution I of similar inputs. Let us
sample nine pairs of similar inputs from I and draw their privacy loss random variables as a graph
centered at 0 on the horizontal axis. We shade each graph with blue if its area is at least 1 − 𝛿 in
the interval [−𝜖, 𝜖], and red otherwise.
Under Definition 9, the two distributions are (𝜖, 𝛿)-
pointwise indistinguishable if the shaded area in the in-
terval [−𝜖, 𝜖] is at least 1 − 𝛿 . Using this visual criterion,
the definition of (𝜖, 𝛿, 𝛼)-random differential privacy says
that, if we repeatedly sample similar inputs from I and in-
spect the corresponding graph of the privacy loss random
variable, then with probability at least 1 − 𝛼 , we will see
a graph whose shaded area is at least 1 − 𝛿 . The example
graphs show seven privacy loss random variable distribu-
tions whose shaded area in the interval [−𝜖, 𝜖] is at least
1 − 𝛿 (colored in blue), and two whose shaded area is less than 1 − 𝛿 (colored in red). Visually, if we
extend this grid of graphs with privacy loss random variables derived from more and more sampled
similar inputs from I, then the parameter 𝛼 bounds the fraction of red graphs in the entire grid.
We say a program 𝑓 is 𝜖-well-behaved if 𝑓 is (𝜖, 0)-differentially private and if 𝑓 ’s path conditions
are exactly necessary and sufficient for proving (𝜖, 0)-differential privacy through the pointwise
proof technique.
Lemma 11. If a program 𝑓 is 𝜖-well-behaved, then 𝑓 is never rejected by DPCheck’s testing framework
when tested with any 𝜖 ′ ≥ 𝜖 .
The proof of Lemma 11 can be found in Appendix A.
We might hope that all (𝜖, 0)-differentially private programs are 𝜖-well-behaved, but this does not
hold in general because DPCheck assumes that proofs of differential privacy for these programs have
a particular structure (Section 5): the path conditions for these programs must be the neccessary and
sufficient conditions for its privacy properties. In Section 7 we will see the ReportNoisyMaxWithGap
algorithm, whose optimal 𝜖 is rejected by DPCheck because its path conditions are sufficient but
not necessary. (DPCheck does accept ReportNoisyMaxWithGap with a non-optimal 𝜖 , for which its
path conditions are both necessary and sufficient.)
Conversely, assume a fixed distribution I of similar inputs and a program 𝑓 . We say that 𝑓 is
(𝜖, 𝛿, 𝛼)-ill-behaved if, given fixed 𝜖 , all valid random differential privacy parameters (𝜖, 𝛿 𝑓 , 𝛼 𝑓 ) for
𝑓 satisfy 𝛿 𝑓 > 𝛿 and 𝛼 𝑓 > 𝛼 . Intuitively, an (𝜖, 𝛿, 𝛼)-ill-behaved program has a high probability of
two kinds of failure—its “catastrophic failure” probability is at least 𝛿 when executed on “good”
similar inputs from I, and there is at least an 𝛼 probability of draws from I yielding “bad” similar
inputs such that, when 𝑓 runs on these inputs, there is a greater than 𝛿 chance that 𝑓 will induce
more privacy cost than 𝜖 .
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Theorem 12. Given a fixed distribution I over similar inputs, a positive integer 𝑘 , an (𝜖 +𝑘𝜔, 𝛿, 𝛼)-
ill-behaved program 𝑓 , and a positive value 𝜃 , if
(1) 𝑓 makes at most 𝑘 calls to the Laplace sampling instructions in one execution,
(2) 𝑓 has at most 𝑛 output buckets (Section 5), and
(3) DPCheck failed to reject 𝑓 , because DPCheck discovered shift𝑖 values (used in eq. (4)) that are
valid for the sampled execution traces,
then, as long as we had run at least 𝑑 tests with independently sampled inputs and with at least𝑚
sampled traces in each test, the probability of such a failure invalidating the claim of (𝜖, 0)-differential
privacy for 𝑓 is at most 𝑒−𝑑 (𝜃+𝛼) , as long as𝑚 ≥ 1𝛿 (𝜃 +𝑛𝑘 ln 2 +𝑛𝑘 ln 𝐶2−𝐶1𝜔 ) where𝐶1 = min𝑖 shift𝑖
and 𝐶2 = max𝑖 shift𝑖 .
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
In practice, the shift𝑖 values are bounded by machine limits. Even if we take 𝐶1 as the smallest
double-precision floating point number, 𝐶2 as the largest, and 𝜔 as the smallest gap between
two double-precision floats, the factor ln |𝐶2−𝐶1 |𝜔 = ln
1.798×10308×2
2−52 is smaller than 747, a small
requirement on the number of sampled traces even in this extreme case.
Note that there is a non-zero gap of 𝑘𝜔 between the tested privacy level 𝜖 for 𝑓 and the level
(𝜖 + 𝑘𝜔, 𝛿, 𝛼) to which 𝑓 is ill behaved. This means DPCheck is only guaranteed to catch bugs
with high probability if 𝑓 ’s behavior differs enough from the claimed levels of differential privacy.
However, since 𝜔 is the granularity of the discretized domain, the value 𝑘𝜔 is typically very small.
(For example, the gap between two double-precision floating point numbers in the interval [0, 1) is
2−52.) Conversely, if 𝑓 ’s behavior is not very far from its claimed level of differential privacy, then
we cannot give any guarantees about the probability of falsely accepting 𝑓 .
Although we presented the testing strategy through the example algorithm rnm, the testing
framework requires no special input particular to rnm. In fact, we can use the testing strategy
described here to check the differential privacy property of many other algorithms, as long as
these algorithms’ differential privacy proofs follow the general template listed in steps 1 to 4
and their program control flow conditions are neccesary and sufficient for differential privacy. In
Appendix D, we describe a variety of algorithms tested using this strategy; we also present the
ReportNoisyMaxWithGap algorithm, whose optimal privacy cost cannot be established using this
strategy, though it can still be validated as differentially private with a non-optimal 𝜖 . In Section 7,
we discuss the details of a practical workflow that applies DPCheck to develop, test, and integrate
core differential privacy mechanisms with an existing software system designed for the 2020 US
Census.
7 EVALUATION
We seek to answer the following questions:
1. How expressive is DPCheck’s testing strategy?
2. Can DPCheck assist implementations of real-world systems that use differential privacy?
To answer these questions, we first used DPCheck to distinguish private and non-private variants
of 10 differential privacy benchmark algorithms from the literature. Second, we used DPCheck in
a practical workflow to re-implement and test the core differential privacy mechanism from the
Disclosure Avoidance System (DAS) for the 2020 US Census [Petti and Flaxman 2019]. To save
space, we concentrate on the latter experiment and give just a brief summary of the former; further
details can be found in Appendix C.
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Framework nc nm ns ps pt rnm rnmGap ss sv svGap
DPCheck Correct ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓∗ ✓ ✓ ✓
Buggy ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
LightDP ✓? ✓? ✓? ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓?
StatDP ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
ShadowDP ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
Proof Synthesis ✓? ✓? ✓ ✓ ✗? ✓ ✓? ✓ ✓ ✓?
DP-Finder ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
Fig. 1. DPCheck test results and coverage comparison on benchmark algorithms with other frameworks.
7.1 Benchmark Algorithms (Summary)
We used DPCheck to implement a suite of benchmark algorithms from the literature. For each
algorithm, we built both a correct implementation and several non-differentially-private variants.
We expected DPCheck to accept the correct implementation according to Lemma 11 and to detect
and reject all non-differentially-private variants. The results are shown in Figure 1. We place a ✓ in
the “Correct” row if DPCheck accepts the correct implementation under the algorithm’s optimal
privacy cost, and we put a ✓ in the “Buggy” row if DPCheck rejects all non-differentially private
variants of this algorithm. For the ReportNoisyMaxWithGap (rnmGap) algorithm, we write ✓∗ to
indicate that DPCheck does not accept its correct implementation with the optimal privacy cost
but does accept with twice the optimal privacy cost. Details can be found in Appendix C.
We also compare the coverage over these ten benchmark algorithms between DPCheck and
related frameworks in Figure 1. For each related framework, ✓ indicates that the framework in
the corresponding row has successfully analyzed the algorithm in the corresponding column. A
✗ represents that the framework in the corresponding row cannot be used to test or verify the
algorithm in the corresponding column. A gray✓?indicates that the authors of this framework have
not presented an evaluation of the algorithm in the corresponding column either in its publication
or its released software artifact, but that we believe the framework has enough expressive power to
handle this algorithm. Similarly, a gray ✗?indicates our belief that the algorithm in the corresponding
column is beyond the capabilities of the framework.
The table shows that DPCheck correctly accepts private implementations and rejects faulty
variants of all previous studied benchmark algorithms. Additionally, it is the first framework able
to distinguish between correct and faulty variants of PrivTree.
PrivTree is challenging for automatic verification of differential privacy for at least two reasons.
The first is that PrivTree terminates probabilistically, i.e., the probability of PrivTree not terminating
after 𝑛 iterations of its main loop diminishes as 𝑛 increases. The second reason is that the privacy
analysis used in the PrivTree’s privacy proof involves intermediate privacy costs that depend on
input values [Zhang and Kifer 2017a].
The first characteristic poses issues for static analyses (including DPCheck’s symbolic interpreter),
as we cannot statically know how many iterations PrivTree will run. Fortunately, as discussed
in Section 5, our symbolic interpreter only needs to produce trees that match those observed in
the instrumented execution. The trees produced by PrivTree contain strictly more nodes as loop
iteration counts increase. Thus, our symbolic interpreter can stop searching for matching trees
once it realizes that all future iterations will produces trees that cannot match those observed in
the instrumented executions.
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The second characteristic is a serious issue for tools aimed at automatically generating proofs of
differential privacy. Since such tools need to reason over all possible input values, intermediate
privacy costs that depend on inputs must be represented by expressions over these unknown
inputs. For PrivTree, these intermediate privacy cost expressions involve non-linear arithmetic, an
undecidable theory that can only be solved in a best-effort way by SMT solvers.
By contrast, DPCheck’s testing framework chooses a pair of concrete input values and evaluates
PrivTree over these inputs. This allows the testing framework to represent intermediate privacy
costs with much simpler symbolic expressions.
The two most challenging algorithms for existing validation and verification frameworks are
PrivTree and ReportNoisyMaxWithGap. StatDP and DP-Finder cannot process the complex output
type of PrivTree—tree data structures, since both of these tools rely on heuristics that are designed
to detect DP violations on numerical outputs. LightDP and ShadowDP, the two type-system based
tools, fail at PrivTree due to the unbounded probabilistically terminating main loop. We believe
PrivTree is out-of-scope for the proof synthesis framework for the same reason—the proof synthesis
framework would not be able to analyze an unbounded probabilistically terminating main loop.
We believe StatDP and DP-Finder’s implementations could be improved with additional heuristics
to handle the output datatype of ReportNoisyMaxWithGap, while LightDP and ShadowDP require
changes to their type systems. The proof synthesis artifact is unavailable, but since it is based on
apRHL, and apRHL is expressive enough to prove differential privacy for ReportNoisyMaxWithGap,
we believe the proof synthesis framework can handle ReportNoisyMaxWithGap.
7.2 Disclosure Avoidance System
Every ten years, the US Census Bureau conducts a national survey to count the total population in
the United States. This survey, refered to as the Decennial Census, provides critical information for
the Federal Government to adjust allocation of funds, as well as representation in the US House of
Representatives, where each state gets a number of delegates proportional to its population. For
the 2020 Census, the US Census Bureau developed an open-source Disclosure Avoidance System
(DAS) to aggregate raw survey data into population counts. DAS applies differential privacy to
protect the privacy of survey participants.
DAS aims to produce differentially private population counts for each geographical unit within
each of the six geographical levels in the US: the whole nation, individual states, counties, “census
tracts,” “block groups,” and single city blocks [Petti and Flaxman 2019]. This process would be
straightforward if the only requirement were differential privacy: just count the population in
each geographical unit and add appropriately sampled noise to each count. However, a census
report produced through this idealized process would contain inconsistent counts due to the added
noise: for example, the population count in a state might well be different from the sum of the
population counts from all counties within the state, and there might even be negative counts
for some geographical units where the precise count before adding noise was small. The Census
Bureau has a list of data requirements that rules out these inconsistencies, and the final report
produced by DAS must satisfy these requirements [Petti and Flaxman 2019].
To address these issues, DAS applies a so-called “TopDown Algorithm.” The TopDown Algorithm
consists of 2 phases. The first phase calculates precise (and secret) counts for all geographical units,
then adds appropriately sampled noise to produce noisy public counts.
The second phase iterates over the geographical hierarchy, ordered from coarsest (nation) to
finest (block). Each step takes the noisy counts from two adjacent levels and perturbs them using
constrained optimization. The constrained optimization process perturbs noisy counts to rule out
inconsistencies, while the optimization objective keeps the overall perturbation of noisy counts as
small as possible.
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geometricFixedSens :: Expr Int
→ Expr Double
→ Expr Double
→ Expr (⃝ (Int , Double))
geometricFixedSens trueAnswer sens eps = do
let alpha = fexp ((- eps) / sens)
let prob = 1 - alpha
noisedAnswer ← geo trueAnswer alpha
return (pair noisedAnswer (2 * alpha / (prob * prob)))
loopGeometricFixedSens :: Expr [(Int , (Double , Double))]
→ Expr (⃝ [(Int , Double)])
loopGeometricFixedSens inputs = do
(_, outputs) ← loop (inputs , nil) loopCond loopIter
return outputs
where loopCond (inputs , _) =
(neg $ isNil inputs :: Expr Bool)
loopIter (inputs , outputs) = do
let thisInputAndTail = fromJust $ uncons inputs
let thisInput = fst thisInputAndTail
let more = snd thisInputAndTail
let trueAnswer = fst thisInput
let sens = fst (snd thisInput)
let eps = snd (snd thisInput)
(noisedAnswer , variance) ←
geometricFixedSens trueAnswer sens eps
return $ (more , snoc outputs (pair noisedAnswer variance))
Fig. 2. DAS Core Mechanism
Since the outputs from the first phase already satisfy differential privacy, the outputs from the
second phase do too (because differential privacy is robust to postprocessing [Dwork et al. 2006]).
The second phase does not introduce any additional randomly sampled noise.
DAS is an interesting target for differential privacy testing due to the social importance of DAS’s
privacy properties. Furthermore, by applying DPCheck on a piece of large, real-world software
artifact like DAS, we gain insight on how DPCheck can assist in developing real-world software
systems that interact with sensitive data through differential privacy in the future.
For this evaluation, we manually re-implemented, in DPCheck, the core privacy mechanism that
calculates the scale of noise distributions and releases the noisy counts for each geographical unit.
We used the DPCheck testing framework to check that this mechanism is, indeed, differentially
private, and verified DPCheck can reject faulty variants of this mechanism. The faulty variants were
edited from the correct implementation to simulate common programming mistakes—sampling
noise with wrong parameters, and iterating over the input list with off-by-one errors. Finally, we
mechanically extracted the DPCheck code to Python3 code (by pretty-printing, essentially).
Figure 2 shows the DPCheck code that re-implements the core privacy mechanism. The function
geometricFixedSens takes a precise count trueAnswer, a parameter sens that bounds the difference
of trueAnswer between similar inputs, and the amount of privacy budget allocated for adding noise
to this value eps. Here, trueAnswer corresponds to the accurate and secret count of population in a
geographical unit. The value of sens measures how much the precise count of this geographical
unit can change between two similar inputs of the Census data; it is determined manually by
Census scientists. The value of eps is also determined by Census scientists, to provide a suitable
level of privacy protection. From sens and eps, we can calculate the appropriate 𝛼 parameter of the
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two-sided geometric distribution and add sampled noise to trueAnswer to produce a differentially
private noisy answer.
The function loopGeometricFixedSens takes a list of input values in the form
(trueAnswer1, (sens1, eps1)) , . . . , (trueAnswer𝑛, (sens𝑛, eps𝑛))
and creates an output list of the same size that contains the noisy answers for each trueAnswer𝑖
in the list. The privacy guarantee of this procedure is that it is (∑𝑖 eps𝑖 , 0)-differentially private.
We try to experimentally detect violations of differential privacy from loopGeometricFixedSens by
randomly generating similar list inputs, running DPCheck’s testing framework with the generated
lists, and checking that each test reports no violations. We repeat this entire procedure in a non-
terminating loop running on a cloud virtual machine that stores all test logs and raises alarms for
any test failure. The size of the input lists increase with each passing test, up to 100.
We observed that the tests occasionally fail due to a tiny over-use of the 𝜖-privacy budget—in
the range 10−12 to 10−15. We believe this was caused by rounding errors from the floating point
operations that calculate noise distribution parameters in geometricFixedSens. We also observed
that if we relax the privacy parameter to
∑
𝑖 eps𝑖 + 10−12, then all of our test cases passed. This
suggests that the total privacy cost incurred by running loopGeometricFixedSens is a small value
plus the sum of intended 𝜖𝑖 values, due to rounding in floating point operations.
Indeed, we expect the original version of DAS to also have this property, since its Python3
implementation also uses floating-point arithmetic. We confirmed this conjecture by intercepting
the raw inputs to the core privacy mechanism in the original version of DAS, converting these
inputs into 128-bit floating point numeric representations, which preserves much more precision
than the 64-bit floating point numbers used in DAS, and calculating the total privacy cost in
128-bit floats. We then compared this higher-precision total privacy cost with the total privacy
cost reported by the original version of DAS. This comparison reveals that the total privacy cost is
around 1.03× 10−11 more than the reported total privacy cost. Of course, because the extra privacy
cost is extremely small, it does not significantly degrade the privacy protections provided by DAS.
Finally, to confirm that our re-implemented privacy mechanism behaves the same as the original
version, we extract loopGeometricFixedSens to Python3 and replace the original core mechanism
with the extracted code (shown in Appendix H). We then apply the following test setup to compare
the behavior between two versions of DAS. For each trial:
(1) Run both versions of DAS 500 times.
(2) Assume that both groups of outputs come from the same distribution (since we assume both
versions of DAS exhibit identical behavior); run statistical test to check if there is evidence to
reject this assumption.
(3) Record the 𝑝-value from the hypothesis test.
If our null hypothesis—that both versions of DAS behave identically—is true, then we should
observe that the recorded 𝑝-values follow a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1] [Murdoch
et al. 2008]. Accordingly, we perform one final hypothesis test on the recorded 𝑝-values to search
for evidence that suggests otherwise.
To run DAS, we need census data as inputs. The US Census Bureau tested DAS’s functionality
using 1940 Census data [Ruggles et al. 2020]. With the 1940 Census data, each DAS run takes
roughly 6 hours on our test machine. Since we need to perform 500 runs on each version of DAS
per trial, and perform many trials to record enough 𝑝-values, we cannot afford to run DAS on the
full 1940 Census dataset.
Instead, we subsample around 1 percent of the 1940 Census dataset and perform our trials over
this smaller dataset. On our subset of the 1940 Census data, each run takes around 10 minutes to
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 4, No. OOPSLA, Article 165. Publication date: November 2020.
165:20 Hengchu Zhang, Edo Roth, Andreas Haeberlen, Benjamin C. Pierce, and Aaron Roth
finish and produces a vector of 287509 counts for the geographical units contained in the smaller
dataset. We also parallelize the trials with 12 machines to speed up the entire test process.
Since our null hypothesis is that the two versions of DAS produces the same output distribution,
we need a statistical test that can invalidate our null hypothesis based on the observations of the
output vectors. We use multivariate permutation testing [Chung and Romano 2016] for this task.
The multivariate permutation test takes two groups of samples as inputs. In our case, the two
groups are each 500 vectors, one produced by our modified version of DAS and the other produced
by the original version of DAS. The test randomly swaps vectors between these two groups and
compares a test statistic derived from the difference of sample mean vectors from them before and
after swapping. Intuitively, if both groups of samples truly come from the same distribution, then
the test statistic should not change much due to swapping.
Each run of the permutation test produces a 𝑝-
value. Tests that consistently produce very small
𝑝-values are evidence invalidating our null hy-
pothesis that two versions of DAS have identical
behavior. Here, we are checking for the lack of
such evidence: when our assumption is indeed
true, the 𝑝-values are samples drawn uniformly
at random in the interval [0, 1]. We perform a
final Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [Massey 1951] to
check if there is evidence for rejecting the hypothesis that 𝑝-values are drawn from a uniform
distribution. This final test produces a 𝑝-value of 0.68, signaling a lack of evidence to reject the
hypothesis that the recorded 𝑝-values are sampled from a uniform distribution. We can also plot
a histogram of the observed 𝑝-values (Section 7.2), which visually shows the collected 𝑝-values.
These results produce no evidence for rejecting our null hypothesis that the two versions of DAS
indeed behave identically.
To summarize our evaluation of DPCheck on the DAS workflow: we successfully re-implemented
the privacy mechanism used by DAS, tested its privacy properties using DPCheck’s testing frame-
work, extracted the DPCheck implementation into Python3 code, re-integreted this extracted
privacy mechanism with the rest of DAS, and confirmed statistically that this modified version of
DAS behaves the same as the original. This case study demonstrates that we can develop and test
core differential privacy mechanisms in DPCheck and then integrate these core procedures with
large software systems through mechanized code extraction.
8 OPTIMIZATIONS
Speeding up symbolic execution. We described a program transformation, streamline, that turns
DPCheck programs into straight-line programs in Section 5.4. This transformation produces expo-
nentially many straight-line programs that each need to be analyzed, placing a bottleneck on the
size of inputs we can test. To mitigate this blowup in some cases, we implemented an optimized
symbolic interpreter that does not require streamline and instead applies a type-driven state-
merging algorithm developed by Torlak and Bodik [2014] This massively speeds up DPCheck’s
symbolic execution and allows us to scale the generation of symbolic formulas to much larger input
sizes. However, these formulas are more complex than those produced by the simpler method, and
solving them is likely NP-complete. After comparing the end-to-end testing time with and without
this optimization, we observed that the only algorithms that saw a speedup are the ones whose
intermediate states merge well (such as ReportNoisyMax), while algorithms such as SparseVector,
whose intermediate states do not merge well, performed worse than with the original approach.
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DPCheck’s testing framework supports both versions, so that users may take advantage of the
state-merging optimizations when appropriate.
Bucketing Double results. As described in Section 5, the testing process involves a “bucketing” step
that groups sampled traces with the same outputs. This step is easy for algorithms that yield a small
number of different outputs, as we only need to perform equality tests to group the sampled traces.
However, DPCheck is not limited to such algorithms. For example, SmartSum and SparseVectorGap
both yield Doubles, which are computed using values sampled from Laplace distributions. It is
highly unlikely that any two runs of SmartSum or SparseVectorGap will produce the same Laplace
samples, even if they follow the same control flow path. So we cannot simply use equality tests to
bucket the outputs.
One solution is to restrict the output types of algorithms so that they only contain a small number
of possible values, but this severely limits the kinds of algorithms that can be tested with DPCheck.
Instead, DPCheck chooses a heuristic that trades off some completeness for allowing programmers
to test algorithms that may return sampled Double values. At test time, DPCheck’s instrumented
interpreter attaches a distribution provenance to each sampled value and to results of arithmetic
expressions that involve sample values.
For example, if 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 are two independent samples from the Laplace distribution with center
0 and width 1, then 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 have distribution provenance lap10,1 and lap20,1, and an expression
such as 𝑥1 · 𝑥2 has distribution provenance lap10,1 · lap20,1. The superscript allows us to distinguish
the distribution provenance of 𝑥1 · 𝑥2 from 𝑥1 · 𝑥1 and thus recognize that these are two different
distributions.
DPCheck’s testing framework then buckets output sample values based on the equality between
distribution provenance structures when the output values are not equal due to independent
sampling. Since most algorithms that do return sampled values only sample from a handful of
possible output distributions, this heuristic significantly cuts down the number of output buckets
for such algorithms.
This heuristic does not sacrifice soundness with respect to the PW-Eq proof rule. PW-Eq allows
us to construct one pointwise proof for each pair of equal output values. Here, DPCheck’s heuristic
still adheres to this quota; indeed, it goes a step further by posing an even more stringent quota
that only allows one pointwise proof for each pair of equal output distributions. In our evaluation,
this heuristic allows us to test several benchmark algorithms that return sampled Double values.
Attaching distribution provenance values to sample values introduces some interpretation overhead,
but this overhead is not a bottleneck in DPCheck’s testing performance in our evaluation.
9 LIMITATIONS
Gap from Theoretical Guarantees. Due to scaling issues, our current testing framework does
not allow us to run tests large enough to give meaningful (𝜖, 𝛿, 𝛼)-random differential privacy
guarantees through Theorem 12. For example, to achieve guarantees with 𝛿 = 10−5, by Theorem 12
we know we need at least 105 samples. Our current evaluation uses between 500 to 5000 sampled
traces per test iteration—i.e. the theoretical lower limit on sampled traces is at least 20 times
larger than our current test parameter. Furthermore, the size of the formula to be solved by Z3
grows linearly with the number of sampled traces we use. Since the time it takes to solve these
formulas grows exponentially in terms of formula size, testing with 105 sampled traces may
conservatively slow down testing time by around 𝑘20 for some base exponent 𝑘 . Given these scaling
issues, DPCheck’s testing framework is more useful for catching differential privacy bugs than for
validation.
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Numerical Implementation Issues. We study DPCheck’s testing guarantees by assuming a count-
ably infinite discretized domain, where consecutive points in the discretized domain are exactly 𝜔
apart. But DPCheck’s implementation uses double-precision floating point numbers. This mismatch
is known to lead to privacy leaks [Ding et al. 2019; Mironov 2012]. It can be remedied by using
fixed-precision numbers.
Improving Symbolic Execution on Probabilistically Terminating Programs. PrivTree is the only
probabilistically terminating program we have tested in the evaluation. To avoid infinitely unrolling
the main loop of PrivTree during its symbolic execution, we explicitly abort the computation
when the outputs from symbolic execution cannot possibly be matched with those observed in
instrumented execution. This is a rather ad-hoc treatment that introduces an unnecessary abort
instruction in DPCheck. However, it is possible to generalize the underlying principle behind our
current treatment of probabilistically terminating programs. First, the programmer needs to identify
a metric over the program’s output, and must ensure that this metric is monotonically increasing as
more iterations of the program are executed. Next, we can find the maximum value of this metric in
the outputs among the instrumented executions, and cut off a potentially infinite unrolling in the
symbolic execution when this loop metric exceeds the maximum value observed from instrumented
executions.
10 RELATEDWORK
The diverse body of related research on programming-language approaches to differential privacy
can be roughly grouped into these categories.
Axiomatic Systems. Many languages have been designed explicitly for implementing differentially
private programs. Notable examples are: (1) Fuzz [Reed and Pierce 2010], a functional programming
language with a linear type system for tracking functional sensitivity and 𝜖-differential privacy,
(2) DFuzz [Gaboardi et al. 2013], a dependently typed Fuzz that allows index-refinement types for
more precise tracking of 𝜖-differential privacy, (3) AdaptiveFuzz [Winograd-Cort et al. 2017], a
multi-stage functional programming language that supports Adaptive Composition [Rogers et al.
2016] of differential privacy, (4) and Duet [Near et al. 2019], a functional programming language
that extends Fuzz to approximate differential privacy.
These languages are designed with specialized type systems that internalize differential privacy
proofs of useful mechanisms. DPCheck is also a language for programming differential privacy,
but it is our choice to not use a specialized type system for differential privacy in DPCheck. The
datatypes in DPCheck are only simple types that help programmers avoid common mistakes such
as multiplying a number by a list. By only using a standard type system, we keep DPCheck’s testing
design applicable to conventional programming languages and idioms.
Mechanized Proof Systems. There has been a line of work on developing type and proof systems
for the purpose of building machine-checkable proofs for differential privacy. Examples include:
(1) LightDP [Zhang and Kifer 2017b], a dependently typed language that uses annotations to
automate differential privacy proofs, (2) ShadowDP [Wang et al. 2019], an improvement over
LightDP that handlesmore sophisticated algorithms, with less annotation, and in less time, (3) apRHL
[Barthe et al. 2016b], a program logic built on probability distribution coupling theory for manual
proofs of differential privacy, (4) work by Albarghouthi and Hsu [2017] on a system that borrows
from apRHL to automatically synthesize differential privacy proofs, and (5) work by Barthe et al.
[2019] on a system that automatically proves and disproves differential privacy for a language
restricted to finite domains.
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The goal of these systems is to mechanically certify privacy of small programs with complex
proofs. They all rely on general typing (or proof) rules that can capture the proofs of mechanisms
such as ReportNoisyMax and SparseVector. LightDP, ShadowDP, and Albarghouthi and Hsu [2017]’s
work all perform static analysis with the help of a solver; for privacy mechanisms with interme-
diate steps that depend on input values (e.g., PrivTree), the underlying solver would likely yield
inconclusive results due to arithmetic complexities [Zhang and Kifer 2017b]. Furthermore, these
systems often carry the burden of proving termination of the program under analysis. When faced
with probabilistically terminating programs (e.g. PrivTree), they fail to produce useful analysis.
DPCheck achieves greater expressiveness compared to these systems by considering the privacy
properties of particular runs of a program, rather than trying to prove the program’s privacy prop-
erty. This testing-based approach avoids the arithmetic challenge described by [Zhang and Kifer
2017b], since much of the arithmetic complexity is evaluated away early, and allows DPCheck to
gracefully test probabilistically-terminating programs by limiting its symbolic exploration through
instrumentation traces.
Barthe et al. [2019]’s work is unique in that the authors restrict the problem of automatic
verification to a finite domain. In their model language, all data types contain a finite number of
elements. This restriction allows the authors to craft complete decision procedures that prove or
disprove differential privacy. DPCheck does not restrict its datatypes to finite domains, and its
testing framework is not complete. Supporting programs with unusual differential privacy proof
structures remains an important direction of our future research.
Since DPCheck tests a program for differential privacy, and cannot prove differential privacy.
DPCheck by itself may not be sufficient for critical applications. When absolute guarantee of
differential privacy is required, a more manual verification with a mechanized proof system is still
necessary.
Statistical Testing. studies how to invalidate hypotheses about probability distributions; its
techniques have also been applied to detect violations of differential privacy. Representative work
includes: (1) StatDP [Ding et al. 2018], a framework for statistical testing of differential privacy,
(2) DP-Finder [Bichsel et al. 2018], a framework that detects violations of differential privacy
through code transformation, a careful sampling technique and objective optimization, and (3) work
by Wilson et al. [2019], a SQL toolkit for differential privacy.
DPCheck is very similar to StatDP and DP-Finder in their goal of automatic testing of differential
privacy, but they are very different in how they achieve this goal.
StatDP repeatedly runs the program under test, constructs two histograms approximating the
two output distributions on similar inputs, and compares these two histograms using statistical
tests to detect violations of differential privacy.
DP-Finder applies a novel sampling technique to construct a formula that approximates the
privacy loss random variable, and then infers a lower bound of 𝜖 through objective optimization on
this approximation formula.
DPCheck also repeatedly runs a program under test on one of the two similar inputs, using an
instrumented interpreter that collects traces. Both StatDP and DP-Finder place restrictions on the
shape of outputs from programs under tests, because both frameworks apply heuristics to detect
output events that likely indicates a violation of differential privacy. DPCheck adapts a general
proof technique into a testing strategy, so that we only require equality tests on outputs of the
program under test.
Wilson et al. [2019] developed an extension to the PostgreSQL database that checks differential
privacy properties of SQL queries. They also applied histogram-based statistical testing to validate
the correctness of their implementation of the extension.
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11 FUTUREWORK
Addressing the scalability of DPCheck’s testing framework remains the most important avenue for
improvement. Section 8 introduced a type-driven optimization to remove one of two significant
scaling bottlenecks; this optimization speeds up symbolic execution, but checking satisfiability for
the resulting formulas remains a serious bottleneck. In practice, this bottleneck prohibits DPCheck’s
testing framework to run tests large enough for validation at a high confidence level.
To reduce this gap between theory and implementation, we plan on improving both sides. On
the theory side, Theorem 12 only gives a very crude lower bound on the number of sampled traces
required for a given confidence level; we believe it can be improved by more careful analysis. On
the implementation side, (1) we can develop domain specific solver heuristics for the kinds of
formulas that DPCheck generates, and (2) we can develop specification-based testing for DPCheck,
approaching validation through programmer annotations of shift values rather than using Z3 to
synthesize them.
Other avenues for improvement also remain. In particular, we hope to (1) harden the current
implementation using fixed-precision instead of floating point numbers, (2) improve the current
ad-hoc treatment of probabilistically terminating programs as discussed in Section 9, and (3)
incorporate more sophisticated relations on samples to increase expressiveness.
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A PROOF OF LEMMA 12
DPCheck’s testing framework only rejects programs for which it cannot construct valid dual
executions. Here, we show that 𝑓 always has a valid dual execution, so that it is never rejected by
the testing framework.
If the program 𝑓 is 𝜖-well-behaved, then we know there is a pointwise proof for its (𝜖, 0)-
differential privacy. In particular, for any similar inputs (𝑥1, 𝑥2) for 𝑓 , consider a run of 𝑓 on 𝑥1
that outputs some output 𝑟 . Take the application of PW-Eq in the privacy proof of 𝑓 , and inspect
the applications of the Lap-Gen rule for that output 𝑟 .
This sequence of applications of Lap-Gen specifies a sequence of shift values for this run of 𝑓
applied to 𝑥1. Consider a dual execution of 𝑓 on 𝑥2 where the Laplace samples are constructed from
this sequence of shift values specified by the applications of Lap-Gen. Since 𝑓 ’s path conditions
are necessary and sufficient for proving its (𝜖, 0)-differential privacy, we know the constructed
Laplace samples in dual execution must follow a control flow path that leads to the same output 𝑟 .
So DPCheck would not reject this 𝑓 . □
B PROOF OF THEOREM 13
Given the assumptions of Theorem 12, we know there are at most 𝑛 possible output buckets. For
each of output bucket, our testing process is trying to find a valid shift vector, such that the ensemble
of the 𝑛 shift vectors form valid dual executions.
Definition 13. Given vectors ®𝑣 and ®𝑞 in R𝑛 , we say that ®𝑞 is an 𝜔-approximation of ®𝑣 if each
coordinate ®𝑞𝑖 is in the discretized domain, and |®𝑣𝑖 − ®𝑞𝑖 | ≤ 𝜔 .
However, recall that DPCheck’s semantics assumes a discretized subset of the reals with granu-
larity 𝜔 for all representable numbers. Our testing process uses Z3, which operates with rational
semantics. To ensure that each coordinate of the shift vector is in the discretized ring, we must
use the 𝜔-approximations of the rational shift vectors that Z3 finds in this analysis. The associated
privacy costs of these 𝜔-approximations will be larger than the original prescribed 𝜖 privacy cost,
since each coordinate has been perturbed by up to 𝜔 . Taking the cost equation for Lap-Gen into
account, the total privacy cost could increase by a maximum of 𝑘𝜔 . So, in fact, the testing process
is trying to find evidence of (𝜖 + 𝑘𝜔, 0)-differential privacy for the program under test, where 𝑘
is the maximum size of a shift vector among the 𝑛 output buckets. We will let 𝜖 ′ = 𝜖 + 𝑘𝜔 in the
remainder of the proof.
Now, on a pair of sampled inputs, by assumption, we know 𝛿 lower-bounds the probability
that the instrumented run draws the “bad” sampled traces, for which we cannot construct dual
executions whose output distributions satisfy eq. (1) with (𝜖 ′, 0). So, as long as any bad sampled
trace appears, the testing process will successfully reject this faulty program. We are considering
the opposite case, where the testing process fails to reject this faulty program.
By assumptions, each “good” sampled trace appears with probability at most 1 − 𝛿 . So the
probability that all 𝑚 sampled traces are good is at most (1 − 𝛿)𝑚 . For these “good” sampled
traces, the testing process is trying to discover 𝑛 shift vectors (one for each output bucket), that are
evidence of valid dual executions.
Again, by assumptions, each shift value is in [𝐶1,𝐶2] with𝐶1 = min𝑖 shift𝑖 and𝐶2 = max𝑖 shift𝑖 .
This bound is only discovered ex post, after DPCheck has already failed to reject the algorithm 𝑓 .
For our theoretical analysis, we can assume DPCheck starts the search of shift values in a small
interval, and doubling the search space each time it fails to discover any valid shift values until it
succeeds.
So the search process coveres 𝐶2−𝐶1𝜔 + 𝐶2−𝐶12𝜔 + 𝐶2−𝐶14𝜔 + · · · = 2(𝐶2−𝐶1)𝜔 different values in each
coordinate. And, since there are at most 𝑘 coordinates in each shift vector, and there are 𝑛 shift
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vectors in total, the total number of possible shift vectors is
2𝑛𝑘
(
𝐶2 −𝐶1
𝜔
)𝑛𝑘
If the testing process does find some set of 𝑛 shift vectors that lead to valid dual executions
for the𝑚 sampled traces, then this test fails to reject the program under test. Let P[FAIL(𝑥1, 𝑥2)]
denote the total probability that the testing process fails to reject the program under test on the
sampled similar inputs (𝑥1, 𝑥2). Then, we know
P[FAIL(𝑥1, 𝑥2)] ≤ (1 − 𝛿)𝑚2𝑛𝑘
(
𝐶2 −𝐶1
𝜔
)𝑛𝑘
≤ 𝑒−𝛿𝑚2𝑛𝑘
(
𝐶2 −𝐶1
𝜔
)𝑛𝑘
.
If we want 𝑒−𝛿𝑚2𝑛𝑘
(
𝐶2−𝐶1
𝜔
)𝑛𝑘 ≤ 𝑒−𝜃 for some 𝜃 , then we can derive a lower bound for𝑚
𝑒−𝛿𝑚2𝑛𝑘
(
𝐶2 −𝐶1
𝜔
)𝑛𝑘
≤ 𝑒−𝜃
−𝛿𝑚 + 𝑛𝑘 ln 2 + ln
{(
𝐶2 −𝐶1
𝜔
)𝑛𝑘}
≤ −𝜃
𝜃 + 𝑛𝑘 ln 2 + 𝑛𝑘 ln 𝐶2 −𝐶1
𝜔
≤ 𝛿𝑚
1
𝛿
(
𝜃 + 𝑛𝑘 ln 2 + 𝑛𝑘 ln 𝐶2 −𝐶1
𝜔
)
≤ 𝑚. (7)
Now, let’s consider the probability of failing to reject 𝑓 if we repeat the test with 𝑑 pairs of
sampled inputs
(𝑥11, 𝑥12), . . . , (𝑥𝑑1 , 𝑥𝑑2 ).
Weknow that as long as𝑚 satisfies the lower bound in eq. (7), then the probability P[FAIL(𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2)]
(on any pair of similar inputs) of failing to reject 𝑓 is at most 𝑒−𝜃 .
By assumptions, we know that under the distribution I for similar inputs, with probability at
least 𝛼 , the similar inputs have no valid proof of eq. (1) under privacy budget 𝜖 , which means our
testing process can immediately reject 𝑓 if such a pair of inputs are generated. So we know that with
probability at most 1 − 𝛼 , we may get a pair (𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2) that the testing process cannot immediately
reject. So, on a single pair of similar inputs, the probability of failure to reject is at most
(1 − 𝛼)𝑒−𝜃 + 𝛼 · 0 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑒−𝜃 .
Now, for 𝑑 pairs of similar inputs drawn independently at random from I, the probability of
failure to reject any of them P[FAIL(𝑥11, 𝑥12), . . . , FAIL(𝑥𝑑1 , 𝑥𝑑2 )] is at most(
(1 − 𝛼)𝑒−𝜃
)𝑑
= (1 − 𝛼)𝑑𝑒−𝑑𝜃
≤ 𝑒−𝛼𝑑𝑒−𝜃𝑑
= 𝑒−𝑑 (𝜃+𝛼) .
This is the bound on failing to reject a faulty 𝑓 , as long as each test uses more than𝑚 sampled
traces, where𝑚 is lower bounded by eq. (7). □
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Bug 𝜖 TTB Std. dev. ITB Std. dev.
nc 1.0 0.8𝑠 0.7𝑠 1.9 1.6
nm 1.0 2.3𝑠 0.5𝑠 1.0 0.0
ns 1.0 0.5𝑠 0.1𝑠 1.0 0.0
ps 1.0 2.0𝑠 0.5𝑠 1.0 0.0
pt 2.58 0.8𝑠 0.4𝑠 1.0 0.0
rnm 2.0 16.7𝑠 16.3 6.4 5.8
rnmGap 4.0 8.9 12.9𝑠 1.4 0.6
ss 1.0 29.8𝑠 27.7𝑠 11.0 9.8
sv3 1.0 8.7𝑠 3.9𝑠 1.0 0.0
sv4 1.0 27.1𝑠 15.8𝑠 2.3 1.3
sv5 1.0 7.8𝑠 8.2𝑠 1.8 1.1
sv6 1.0 218.8𝑠 173.4𝑠 4.1 3.0
svGap 1.0 1899.1𝑠 1750.2𝑠 2.1 1.3
Fig. 3. Mean time and mean iteration to bug discovery, and their standard deviation on incorrect implemen-
tations. (The value 𝜖 = 2.58 is derived by instantiating PrivTree’s privacy cost formula [Zhang et al. 2016]
with all parameters set to 1.0.)
C EVALUATION OF PRIVACY MECHANISMS
We implemented a number of algorithms from related work on automated verification and testing
[Albarghouthi and Hsu 2017; Ding et al. 2018; Wang et al. 2019; Zhang and Kifer 2017b], as well as
the recently proposed ReportNoisyMaxWithGap and SparseVectorWithGap algorithms from [Ding
et al. 2019] and the PrivTree algorithm. PrivTree, in particular, is cited by authors of LightDP [Zhang
and Kifer 2017b] as a challenging example. The programs we evaluated can be found in Appendix D.
We ran DPCheck’s testing framework on the correct implementation of each of these algorithms
and confirmed that it is accepted. We also implemented non-differentially private variants of each
algorithm and measured the time DPCheck’s testing framework takes to discover the failure. We
used the QuickCheck [Claessen and Hughes 2000] randomized testing library to build test input
generators for DPCheck’s privacy testing framework. We manually wrote one generator for each
type of similarity relation introduced in Section 2.
We run 100 tests on correct algorithms and verify they all pass. For catching bugs, we run only 50
tests and verify the bug is caught within 50 tests. The test count 100 is chosen to run the test suite
for as long as possible on differentially private programs without overloading our test environment.
The test count 50 is empirically chosen to give the testing framework enough chances to observe
failures on all our non-differentially-private benchmarks.
The experiments were run on a virtual test machine with a 2-Core CPU clocked at 2.3GHz, and
7GB of RAM. The results are summarized in Figure 3. For SparseVector, we implemented all four of
the non-differentially-private variants studied in [Lyu et al. 2017]. For the other algorithms, we
implemented one non-differentially private variant. Among these non-private variants, we try to
mimic typical programming mistakes, such as using a wrong variable with name similar to the
correct one, using incorrect width parameter to Laplace sampling instruction, off-by-one errors,
and using the wrong arithmetic operator. The rest of this section reports in more detail on the two
most interesting benchmarks.
ReportNoisyMaxWithGap. ReportNoisyMax returns the index of the largest value in an input list,
after adding some random noise to each of the original values. In addition the returning the index of
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largest noised value, ReportNoisyMaxWithGap also releases the numerical gap between the noised
max value and noised runner-up value. Surprisingly, this additional information does not increase
the privacy cost compared to the original ReportNoisyMax algorithm [Ding et al. 2019]. We ran
the testing framework on a correct implementation of ReportNoisyMaxWithGap with its optimal
𝜖 = 2.0. However, this claim was incorrectly rejected by the testing framework. We manually
inspected the generated symbolic formula for ReportNoisyMaxWithGap, and realized that its path
condition essentially requires releasing the index of the noisy runner-up value. This path condition
is sufficient but not necessary for proving (2.0, 0)-differential privacy for ReportNoisyMaxWithGap.
Our manual analysis also revealed that this path condition should lead to (4.0, 0)-differential privacy
for ReportNoisyMaxWithGap. We ran another test on ReportNoisyMaxWithGap with 𝜖 = 4.0, and
this time the testing framework correctly accepted the algorithm as private.
PrivTree. PrivTree [Zhang et al. 2016] is a differentially private algorithm for building spatial de-
composition trees that approximate occupied regions of space. We implemented a one-dimensional
version of the PrivTree algorithm over the unit interval.
PrivTree is challenging for automatic checking for at least two reasons. The first is that PrivTree
has an unbounded loop that terminates with probability 1—the probability of PrivTree not termi-
nating after 𝑛 iterations of its main loop vanishes as 𝑛 increases, such that the main loop eventually
surely terminates, but the exact number of iterations cannot be statically computed. The second is
that the privacy analysis for PrivTree involves intermediate privacy costs that depend on input
values [Zhang and Kifer 2017a].
The first characteristic poses issues for general static analysis, as we cannot statically unroll
PrivTree’s main loop. DPCheck’s symbolic interpreter is also susceptible to this challenge. However,
for our testing strategy in Section 5 to work, the symbolic interpreter only needs to produce trees
that match those observed in the instrumented execution. With each additional iteration of PrivTree,
the size of the spatial decomposition tree strictly increases. Thus, our symbolic interpreter can
eagerly cut off the rest of the infinite search once it realizes that all future iterations will produce
trees that do not match those observed in the instrumented executions
The second characteristic poses issues for tools that generate proofs of privacy. As such tools
need to reason over all possible similar inputs, the input values must be universally quantified
and unknown at proof-generation time. So intermediate privacy costs that depend on input values
are arithmetic expressions over variables representing these unknown inputs. For PrivTree, these
intermediate privacy cost expressions involve non-linear arithmetic, an undecidable theory that
can only be solved in a best-effort way by SMT solvers.
By contrast, our testing framework repeatedly chooses pairs of concrete inputs to PrivTree. This
means that the intermediate privacy costs can be represented with much simpler symbolic formula,
making automatic privacy analysis for PrivTree feasible with Z3.
D EVALUATED PROGRAMS
D.1 ReportNoisyMax
We presented the source code of ReportNoisyMax in Section 3. The privacy analysis in Section 5
shows that this algorithm is (2, 0)-differentially private.
To test ReportNoisyMax, we need to generate inputs whose coordinate-wise distance (Defini-
tion 4) is bounded by 1. We implement such a generator manually using QuickCheck [Claessen
and Hughes 2000], and repeat DPCheck’s tests for as long as allowed by the virtual test machine.
All of our experiments on ReportNoisyMax so far have yielded successful results.
We also implemented an incorrect version that passes the first value from the input list to rnmAux
without adding Laplace noise. The mistake is highlighted (in bold and red) below:
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rnmBuggy [] =
error "rnm received empty input"
rnmBuggy (x:xs) = do
xNoised ← lap x 1.0
xsNoised ← mapM (𝜆x.lap x 1.0) xs
rnmAux xsNoised 0 0 𝑥
DPCheck’s testing framework catches this mistake very quickly since the un-noised first input to
rnmAux immediately invalidates ReportNoisyMax’s privacy analysis for many similar input values.
D.2 SparseVector
The SparseVector algorithm takes a list of real-valued inputs as the private input and returns the
indices of all the large elements of the input. Two input lists are again considered similar if their
coordinate-wise distance is bounded by 1.
In addition to the private input list, SparseVector takes two additional, non-private parameters:
n :: Int and threshold :: Double. SparseVector produces a list of boolean values where each
True represents an above-threshold input value. The parameter n bounds the total number of Trues
SparseVector may emit before the rest of the computation is truncated. As an example, if the input
is a three-element list and n is 1, then SparseVector may return any of [True], [False,True], and
[False,False,True].
We implement SparseVector in DPCheck as follows:
sv xs n thresh = do
let width = 4.0 * fromIntegral n
thresh ' ← lap thresh 2.0
xs' ← mapM (𝜆x. lap x width) xs
svAux xs' n thresh ' nil
svAux [] _ _ acc = return acc
svAux (x:xs) n thresh acc
| n <= 0 = return acc
| otherwise = do
let recur n' acc ' =
svAux xs n' thresh acc '
if (x > thresh)
(recur (n-1) (snoc acc True))
(recur n (snoc acc False))
Here, nil is an empty list, and snoc is a function that takes a DPCheck list and a list element, and
returns a new list with the element appended to the end of the supplied one.
Lyu et al. [2017] studied six published variants of SparseVector, among which only two actually
satisfy differential privacy with the intended privacy parameter. The SparseVector implementation
shown here is the a correct version proposed by Lyu et al., named Algorithm 1 in [Lyu et al.
2017]. This variant is (1, 0)-differentially private. DPCheck’s testing framework correctly rejects
the four incorrect variants and accepts the two correct variants. We re-used the generators for
ReportNoisyMax to generate input lists for SparseVector, and we used QuickCheck to repeat the
testing process for as long as allowed by our virtual test machine.
D.3 PrefixSum
The PrefixSum algorithm takes a list of numbers and returns a list of the same length, where
each 𝑖th value in the list is the sum of the values at index 0, 1, . . . , 𝑖 . Two inputs to PrefixSum are
considered similar if they have the same length and their 𝐿1-distance (Definition 3) is bounded
by 1. The PrefixSum algorithm achieves (1, 0)-differential privacy by adding Laplace noise with
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width 1 to each of the values in the input list before summing. The DPCheck code implementing
PrefixSum is shown here:
ps xs = do
xs ' ← mapM (𝜆x. lap x 1.0) xs
return (psAux (reverse xs ') nil)
psAux [] acc = acc
psAux (x:xs) acc =
psAux xs (cons (sum (x:xs)) acc)
The reverse :: [𝑎] → [𝑎] function comes from Haskell’s standard library; it returns a list in the
reversed order. (Since the helper function psAux accumulates the prefix sums in the reverse order,
we also need to reverse the noised list of input values.)
We use another manually written generator for 𝐿1-distance-bounded pairs of lists to test Prefix-
Sum, and we similarly repeat the testing process until at least 100 test cases pass.
D.4 SmartSum
The SmartSum algorithm, also known as the Binary Mechanism, is a sophisticated improvement
over PrefixSum that provides the same (1, 0)-differential privacy guarantees, but releases noised
sums with much smaller asymptotic error [Chan et al. 2011]. Data analysts can benefit from the
accuracy improvement with no sacrifice in privacy guarantees by using SmartSum instead of
PrefixSum.
The core idea behind SmartSum is to build a binary tree of partial sums from the input values,
instead of summing up each prefix. We defer the code listing of SmartSum to Appendix F, where we
also show a buggy variant that we created unintentionally along the way. We reuse the generator
for PrefixSum to test SmartSum. DPCheck’s testing framework accepts the correct implementation
and rejects our incorrect one.
D.5 ReportNoisyMaxWithGap
Ding et al. [2019] recently proposed novel variants of the ReportNoisyMax and SparseVector
algorithms that release more information about the input data without increasing their privacy
cost.
For ReportNoisyMaxWithGap, the extra information released is the numerical gap between the
largest noised value and the second largest noised value. The implementation is very similar to
ReportNoisyMax:
rnmGap [] =
error "rnmGap received empty input"
rnmGap [_] =
error "rnmGap received only one input"
rnmGap (x:y:xs) = do
x' ← lap x 1.0
y' ← lap y 1.0
xs ' ← mapM (𝜆x. lap x 1.0) xs
if (x' > y')
(rnmGapAux xs ' 1 0 x' y')
(rnmGapAux xs ' 1 1 y' x')
rnmGapAux [] _ maxIdx
currMax currRunnerUp =
return (maxIdx , currMax - currRunnerUp)
rnmGapAux (x:xs) lastIdx maxIdx
currMax runnerUp = do
let thisIdx = lastIdx + 1
let recur = rnmGapAux xs thisIdx
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if (x > currMax)
(recur thisIdx x currMax)
(if (x > runnerUp)
(recur maxIdx currMax x)
(recur maxIdx currMax runnerUp))
The algorithm keeps track of the runner-up at each iteration in addition to the current maximum
value and its index in the input list, and eventually returns the index of the largest value, and the
difference between the maximum and the runner-up. We reuse the generator for ReportNoisyMax
to test ReportNoisyMaxWithGap with the same privacy parameter 𝜖 = 2.0.
However, DPCheck’s testing framework incorrectly rejects this claim. We manually inspected
the generated symbolic formula to investigate the cause of rejection. The path conditions DPCheck
collects effectively requires the algorithm to also release the index of the runner-up value, and this
is equivalent to running ReportNoisyMax twice, once to find out the index of the largest value, and
a second time to find out the largest in the remaining values. Running ReportNoisyMax twice in
such a way induces a privacy parameter 𝜖 = 2.0 ∗ 2 = 4.0. We check this conjecture by testing
ReportNoisyMaxWithGap again with 𝜖 = 4.0, and DPCheck indeed accepts this claim.
This is a case where DPCheck fails to accept the optimal privacy parameter. The authors of [Ding
et al. 2019] use an analysis that does not require releasing the index of the second largest noised
value, but DPCheck can only make use of facts collected from path conditions. In this case, the
path conditions are overly strict, which doubles the privacy bound required by DPCheck to check
the differential privacy property.
D.6 SparseVectorWithGap
SparseVectorWithGap [Ding et al. 2019] is an improvement over SparseVector that releases the
numeric gap between noised input values and the noised threshold, when the noised input value is
above the noised threshold. We implement SparseVectorWithGap using the following DPCheck
program:
svGap xs n thresh = do
thresh ' ← lap thresh 2.0
let width = 4.0 * fromIntegral n
xs ' ← mapM (𝜆x. lap x width) xs
svGapAux xs ' n thresh ' nil
svGapAux [] _n _thresh acc =
return acc
svGapAux (x:xs) n thresh acc
| n <= 0 = return acc
| otherwise = do
let recur n' acc ' = svGapAux xs n' thresh acc '
if (x > thresh)
(do let acc ' =
snoc acc (just (x - thresh))
recur (n-1) acc ')
(recur n (snoc acc nothing))
Compared to SparseVector, instead of returning a list of boolean values, SparseVectorWithGap
returns a list of optional values. Each nothing value represents the absence of a value, and each
just x represents the existence and the value of x. Our implementation of SparseVectorWithGap
yields just gap instead of True for each above-threshold noised value and its gap between the
noised threshold; it uses nothing instead of False for below-theshold noised values. The parameter
n again bounds the number of above-threshold optionals SparseVectorWithGap can emit before the
rest of the computation is cut short.
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Unlike ReportNoisyMaxWithGap, SparseVectorWithGap’s differential privacy property is ac-
cepted by DPCheck’s testing framework. As the path conditions collected in a symbolic execution
of svGap are the same as that those collected in a symbolic execution of sv. DPCheck’s testing
framework has no issue accepting SparseVectorWithGap’s privacy claims.
D.7 PrivTree
PrivTree [Zhang et al. 2016] is a differentially private algorithm for building spatial decomposition
trees that approximate occupied regions of space. We implemented a one-dimensional version
of the PrivTree algorithm over the unit interval. The input is a list of points on the unit interval,
represented by a list xs :: [Double]. Two input lists are similar if their database distance is
bounded by 1 (Definition 2). Our implementation of PrivTree outputs a distribution over spatial
decomposition trees over the unit interval, represented by the type Map Node (). A Node in the
tree is an interval Node = (Double, Double), representing a sub-interval of the unit interval. In our
implementation of PrivTree, the final output spatial decomposition tree is a collection of leaf nodes
in the tree, and the internal nodes of the decomposition tree are implicitly represented by their
constituent sub-intervals.
For example, if the input list is [0.1, 0.3], then PrivTree may output a tree with leaf nodes
(0.0, 0.25), (0.25, 0.5) and (0.5, 1.0). The first two leaf nodes are occupied by the input points,
while the last leaf node is not occupied; is created when we split the root node (the unit interval)
into (0.0, 0.5) and (0.5, 1.0).
A naive attempt at building such spatial decomposition trees is to take the textbook QuadTree
algorithm [Finkel and Bentley 1974] and use Laplace noise to turn it into a differentially private
algorithm. This naive approach would maintain a queue of spatial sub-regions to analyze. On each
iteration, the algorithm would use the Laplace distribution to obtain a noisy count of nodes in
the sub-region, then decide whether to split the sub-region by comparing the noisy count with
a pre-determined threshold value. Zhang et al. [2016] argue that this method has two significant
drawbacks: 1) to ensure the final privacy parameter has a finite bound, we must also bound the
maximum depth of the spatial tree built by this procedure, and 2) it is difficult to pick a threshold
value that leads to accurate spatial decomposition trees.
The PrivTree algorithm solves these issues by removing requirements of both the depth bound
and the pre-determined threshold. To save space, we defer the implementation of PrivTree to
Appendix G.
PrivTree is a challenging algorithm for automatic verification for at least two reasons. The first
is that PrivTree terminates probabilistically, i.e., the probability of PrivTree not terminating after
𝑛 iterations of its main loop diminishes as 𝑛 increases. The second one is that the privacy cost
analysis used in the PrivTree’s privacy proof involves intermediate privacy costs that depend on
input values [Zhang and Kifer 2017a].
The first characteristic poses issues for static analysis, as we cannot statically know how many
iterations PrivTree will run. DPCheck’s symbolic interpreter is also susceptible to this challenge.
However, recall from Section 5 that the symbolic interpreter only needs to produce trees that match
those observed in the instrumented execution. PrivTree would only need to run more iterations if
it decides to split the current sub-region, which means the final tree will contain more and more
leaf nodes as the number of iterations increases. Thus, our symbolic interpreter can eagerly cut off
the rest of the (infinite) search once it realizes that all future iterations will produces trees that do
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not match those observed in the instrumented executions9, saving DPCheck’s testing framework
from infinite unrolling.
The second characteristic poses issues for tools aimed at automatically generating proofs of
differential privacy. As such tools need to reason over all possible input values, these input values
must be universally quantified and unknown at proof-generation time, which means intermediate
privacy costs that depend on input values must be represented by expressions over the unknown
input values. For PrivTree, these intermediate privacy cost expressions involve non-linear arithmetic,
an undecidable theory that can only be solved in a best-effort way by SMT solvers.
On the other hand, DPCheck’s testing framework chooses a pair of concrete input values and eval-
uates PrivTree over these inputs. This allows the testing framework to represent these intermediate
privacy costs through the much simpler generic shift relation introduced in Section 5.
DPCheck’s testing framework accepts the correct implementation of PrivTree over the unit
interval. We also implemented a buggy version similar to the naive approach but not placing
a depth bound on the tree created. DPCheck’s testing framework correctly rejects this buggy
variation.
D.8 NoisySum, NoisyCount and NoisyMean
The NoisySum, NoisyCount, and NoisyMean algorithms are simple mechanisms that aggregate
private data. We show their implementations below.
noisySum :: [Expr Double]
→ Expr (⃝ Double)
noisySum xs = lap (sum xs) 1.0
noisyCount :: [Expr Double]
→ Expr Double
→ Expr (⃝ Double)
noisyCount xs threshold = do
let c = length (filter (>= threshold) xs)
lap (fromIntegral c) 1.0
The NoisySum algorithm’s similarity relation bounds two lists’ 𝐿1 distance with 1.0, and it is
1.0-differentially private.
The NoisyCount algorithm’s similarity relation bounds two lists’ database distance bounded with
1, while the parameter threshold is public data. This algorithm counts the number of values above
the given threshold, and adds noise to the count before releasing it. The NoisyCount algorithm is
also 1.0-differentially private.
noisyMean :: [Expr Double]
→ Expr Double
→ Expr (⃝ Double)
noisyMean xs clipBound
| clipBound < 0 = error "simpleMean: received clipBound < 0"
| otherwise = do
s ← clippedSum xs 0 clipBound
noisedS ← lap s 1.0
let count =
fromIntegral (lit (length xs))
noisedC ← lap count 1.0
return (noisedS , noisedC)
clippedSum [] acc clipBound =
return acc
9This ad-hoc early cut-off is not hardcoded in the symbolic interpreter, but represented by abort instructions in the source
code. We will discuss how to generalize the ad-hoc cut-off in Section 9.
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clippedSum (x:xs) acc clipBound =
ifM (x >= clipBound)
(clippedSum xs (acc + clipBound))
(ifM (x < (-clipBound))
(clippedSum xs (acc - clipBound))
(clippedSum xs (acc + x)))
TheNoisyMean algorithm’s similarity relation also bounds two lists’ database distance boundedwith
1, while the parameter clipBound is public data. NoisyMean is (clipBound + 1.0)-differentially
private. A critical intermediate step in NoisyMean is to clip each input value into the range
[−clipBound, clipBound] before summing. This step is necessary because extreme outliers will
lead to violations of differential privacy.
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E IMPLEMENTATION OF eval
return :: a → ⃝ a
(>>=) :: ⃝ a → (a → ⃝ b) → ⃝ b
laplace :: Double → Double → ⃝ Double
eval :: Expr a → a
eval (Literal a) = a
eval (Return a) = return (eval a)
eval (Bind a f) = eval a >>= (eval . f . Literal)
eval (Laplace c w) = laplace (eval c) w
eval (If cond a b) = if (eval cond) (eval a) (eval b)
eval (Add a b) = (eval a) + (eval b)
eval (Lt a b) = (eval a) < (eval b)
eval (Loop acc pred iter) = eval (Loop acc pred iter) =
runLoop (eval acc) (eval . pred . Lit) (eval . iter . Lit)
runLoop :: Monad m =>
a → (a → bool) → (a → m a) → m a
runLoop acc pred iter = do
if pred acc
then do
acc ' ← iter acc
runLoop acc ' pred iter
else
return acc
Fig. 4. Source code for eval
F SMARTSUM
smartSum xs = smartSumAux xs 0 0 0 0 nil
smartSumAux [] _ _ _ _ results = return results
smartSumAux (x:xs) next n i sum results = do
let sum ' = sum + x
if_ ((mod (i + 1) 2) == 0)
(do n' ← lap (n + sum ') 1.0
smartSumAux xs n' n' (i+1) 0 (snoc results n')
)
(do next ' ← lap (next + x) 1.0
smartSumAux xs next ' n (i+1) sum ' (snoc results
next '))
Fig. 5. Source code for SmartSum
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 4, No. OOPSLA, Article 165. Publication date: November 2020.
165:38 Hengchu Zhang, Edo Roth, Andreas Haeberlen, Benjamin C. Pierce, and Aaron Roth
smartSumBuggy xs = smartSumAuxBuggy xs 0 0 0 0 nil
smartSumAuxBuggy [] _ _ _ _ results = return results
smartSumAuxBuggy (x:xs) next n i sum results = do
let sum ' = sum + x
if_ ((mod (i + 1) 2) == 0)
(do n' ← lap (n + sum ') 1.0
smartSumAuxBuggy xs n' n' (i+1) sum ' (snoc
results n')) -- bug
(do next ' ← lap (next + x) 1.0
smartSumAuxBuggy xs next ' n (i+1) sum ' (snoc
results next '))
Fig. 6. Source code for SmartSumBuggy
G PRIVTREE
privTree xs = privTreeAux xs [rootNode] (S.singleton rootNode)
emptyTree
privTreeAux points queue leafNodes tree
| length leafNodes > k_PT_MAX_LEAF_NODES
-- to avoid infinite unrolling in symbolic execution
= abort "unreachable code: there are too many leaf nodes"
| otherwise
= case queue of
[] → return tree
(thisNode:more) → do
let biasedCount =
countPoints points thisNode - depth thisNode *
k_PT_DELTA
biasedCount ' ←
if (biasedCount > (k_PT_THRESHOLD - k_PT_DELTA))
(return biasedCount)
(return $ k_PT_THRESHOLD - k_PT_DELTA)
noisedBiasedCount1 ← lap biasedCount ' k_PT_LAMBDA
let updatedTree = updatePT thisNode () tree
if (noisedBiasedCount1 > k_PT_THRESHOLD)
(do let (left , right) = split thisNode
let leafNodes ' =
S.insert right
(S.insert left (S.delete
thisNode leafNodes))
privTreeAux points (more ++[left ,right])
leafNodes ' updatedTree
)
(privTreeAux points more leafNodes updatedTree)
Fig. 7. Source code for PrivTree
In the implementation of PrivTree, we keep track of the current set of leafNodes, and cut off the
rest of the computation when there are more leaf nodes than we have observed in the instrumented
execution.
H EXTRACTED PYTHON3 CODE
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def loop_geometric(true_answer_sens_eps):
"""
:param true_answer_sens_eps: an array -like of (true_answer , (
sensitivity , epsilon))
:return: a list of (noised_answer , variance)
"""
loop_acc = (true_answer_sens_eps , [])
loop_cond = not [] == loop_acc [0]
while loop_cond:
if loop_acc [0]:
uncons_head = loop_acc [0][0]
uncons_tail = (loop_acc [0]) [1:]
uncons_result = (uncons_head , uncons_tail)
else:
uncons_result = None
if loop_acc [0]:
uncons_head1 = loop_acc [0][0]
uncons_tail1 = (loop_acc [0]) [1:]
uncons_result1 = (uncons_head1 , uncons_tail1)
else:
uncons_result1 = None
if loop_acc [0]:
uncons_head2 = loop_acc [0][0]
uncons_tail2 = (loop_acc [0]) [1:]
uncons_result2 = (uncons_head2 , uncons_tail2)
else:
uncons_result2 = None
x = (prim_symmetric_geometric(uncons_result [0][0] , (np.exp ((0.0 -
uncons_result1 [0][1][1]) / uncons_result2 [0][1][0]))))
if loop_acc [0]:
uncons_head3 = loop_acc [0][0]
uncons_tail3 = (loop_acc [0]) [1:]
uncons_result3 = (uncons_head3 , uncons_tail3)
else:
uncons_result3 = None
if loop_acc [0]:
uncons_head4 = loop_acc [0][0]
uncons_tail4 = (loop_acc [0]) [1:]
uncons_result4 = (uncons_head4 , uncons_tail4)
else:
uncons_result4 = None
if loop_acc [0]:
uncons_head5 = loop_acc [0][0]
uncons_tail5 = (loop_acc [0]) [1:]
uncons_result5 = (uncons_head5 , uncons_tail5)
else:
uncons_result5 = None
if loop_acc [0]:
uncons_head6 = loop_acc [0][0]
uncons_tail6 = (loop_acc [0]) [1:]
uncons_result6 = (uncons_head6 , uncons_tail6)
else:
uncons_result6 = None
if loop_acc [0]:
uncons_head7 = loop_acc [0][0]
uncons_tail7 = (loop_acc [0]) [1:]
uncons_result7 = (uncons_head7 , uncons_tail7)
else:
uncons_result7 = None
if loop_acc [0]:
uncons_head8 = loop_acc [0][0]
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uncons_tail8 = (loop_acc [0]) [1:]
uncons_result8 = (uncons_head8 , uncons_tail8)
else:
uncons_result8 = None
if loop_acc [0]:
uncons_head9 = loop_acc [0][0]
uncons_tail9 = (loop_acc [0]) [1:]
uncons_result9 = (uncons_head9 , uncons_tail9)
else:
uncons_result9 = None
loop_acc = (uncons_result3 [1], loop_acc [1] + [(x, 2.0 * (np.exp
((0.0 - uncons_result4 [0][1][1]) / uncons_result5 [0][1][0])) /
((1.0 - (np.exp ((0.0 - uncons_result6 [0][1][1]) /
uncons_result7 [0][1][0]))) * (1.0 - (np.exp ((0.0 -
uncons_result8 [0][1][1]) / uncons_result9 [0][1][0])))))])
loop_cond = not [] == loop_acc [0]
x1 = loop_acc
return x1[1]
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